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January 4, 1974 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 1 
No. 73-762 
SOSNA (and a class) 
v. 
IOWA and KECK (state 
DC judge) 
THREE-JUDGE COURT 
Appeal from USDC ND Iowa 
(Stephenson, Hanson; McManus, 
dis sen ting) 
Federal Civil 
-
1. Following dismissal of her marriage dissolution proceedings by 
District Court of Iowa (Keck) for want of jurisdiction in that appellant did not 
m.eet the divorce durational requirements, appellant brought a class action 
598. 9, which relief wa denied by USDC ND Iowa (Stephenson, Hanson; 
McManus, dis sen ting) (THREE-JUDGE COURT) which dismissed appellant's 
complaint. 
d w~t-i o/fw 4f P~ 
ar,rwp;;~. 
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Appellant claims that she has been denied equal protection by being 
penalized fpr the exercise of her fundamental right of interstate migration, 
and has been denied due process by the creation of an irrebutable presumption 
of law which is overbroad. 
2. FACTS: Appellant is a resident of Iowa, and has resided in the 
state since August, 1972, prior to which she resided in New York. She was 
married to Michael Sosna in 1964 in Michigan. In September, 1972, appellant 
instituted marriage dissolution proceedings against Michael Sosna, a non-
resident, in Iowa District Court. Apparently, Michael Sosna was personally 
served with original notice of the petn for marriage dis solution while he was 
in Iowa. Iowa DC Op, p. 1. In ruling on a special appear~ce of Michael 
Sosna, Iowa DC (Keck) dismissed the petn pursuant to Iowa Code 598. 9 for 
want of jurisdiction. 
Iowa Code 598. 6 reads as follows: 
Except where the respondent is a resident of the state 
and is served by personal service, the petition for dissolution 
of marriage, in addition to setting forth the information 
required by section 598. 5, must state that the petitioner has 
· :j been for the last year a resident of the state, specifying the 
AP, 1 
~/]/ ifj' I 
~v of one 
county in which the petitioner has resided, and the length of 
such residence by a petitioner after deducting all absences 
from the state; and that the maintenance of the residence has 
been in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining a 
marriage dissolution only. 
Iowa Code 598. 9 reads as follows: 
I£ the averments as to residence are not fully proved, 
the hearing shall proceed no further, and the action be 
dismissed by the court. 
In dismissing appellant's suit, USDC first determined that the lapse 
year since August, 1972, does not render the suit moot since the action 
is a class action and there is a reasonable likelihood that the problem will 
I 
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recur with respect to other members of the class. The USDC distinguished 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 ( 1972) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969), on the nature of the rights therein involved other than the right to 
travel. This case does not involve either the right to vote or the privilege to 
receive welfare, but rather the concept of divorce, which is not itself a 
constitutional rig.ht. The interests of Iowa in preventing the state from 
becoming a divorce mill by virtue of its no-fault divorce provisions, in 
fostering a re-examination of the marriage following the move which may 
itself have helped to restore tranquility to the estranged relationship, are 
sufficiently compelling to support the constitutionality of the Iowa statutes 
challenge. 
Chief Judge McManus dissented, relying principally on Dunn. Since 
the impediment attaches to persons recently arriving in Iowa, it must be 
justified only by a compelling state interest. None of the purported interests 
of Iowa justifies the imposition of the one-year durational period for residents 
who wish to divorce non-residents. Since the durational period does not apply 
when non-resident petitioners sue resident respondents for divorce, the 
prospect of Iowa becoming a divorce mill is equally likely. Further, the 
irrebutable presumption against the newly-arrived sweeps too broadly and the 
Iowa judiciary is perfectly competent to make determinations as to the good-
faith residency , of a petitioning spouse. Dunn, at 352. Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441 (1973). Since the one-year residency period applies only where 
the respondent does not reside in Iowa, the rationale of the move fostering 
tranquility has no weight because under the present scheme no durational 
period would be required where spouses were residing in different states. 
Finally, access to the courts is unreasonably restricted. Boddie v. 
- 4 -
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellant claims a denial of equal protection 
through the penalization of her right to travel, and a denial of due process by 
the establishment of a too broad irrebutable presumption. The appeal presents 
substantial questions regarding an important right claimed by appellant. The 
questions are not foreclosed from controversy, and conflicts exist among 
lower federal and state courts. Appellant relies on Shapiro and Dunn. 
4. DISCUSSION: Since the durational requirement appears only to 
apply to those situations where the respondent is not a resident of Iowa, it 
would be possible for one spouse to move into Iowa as a bona fide resident on 
one day and the other spouse, a non-resident of Iowa, could bring suit for - . -
divorce the next day. All the asserted justifications would seem to disappear, 
since Iowa could become as much of a divorce mill by this procedure than by 
:its converse, which is all that the durational requirement seeks to protect 
against, and there would be no joint move to spur the parties to reconciliation. 
An individualized inquiry into bona fide residency would protect Iowa I s interests 
and is a less intrusive way of accomplishing whatever constitutional objectives 
the state may have. Dunn,at 351-352. Vlandis v. Kline. Since Mrs. Sosna 
was able to serve Mr. Sosna in the state any divorce granted would not, it 
appear, have been ex parte and subject to collateral attack, but rather would 
have been a valid bilateral divorce regardless of the residency of either party. 
This case would appear to be in conflict with the decision of the THREE----
JUDGE GOUR Tin Gallogly v. Larsen, No. 73-678, which appeal is listed for 
'/ 
thf December 14, 1973 Conference. In that regard please see Mr. Varat's 
. ,. 
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discussion section in the Preliminary Memo in that case. 
There is no response. 
12/14/73 
PW 
Fergenson USDC and Iowa DC ops in 
petn appx 




Sosna v. Iowa { ~ ) 
The state says that divorce or dissolution of marriage 
is not a constitutional right, nor is it a basic necessity 
of survival. Thus, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the 
brutal need cases such as x Shapiro are not controlling. 
Dunn v. Blumstein is not controlling because that case involved 
a right (to vote) that once lost was gone forever, which is 
not xm true here. 
State residency requirements on divorce are as up in 
the air as residency requirements for state schools, as shown 
by the conflict mentioned in the note. I think the caee should 
be noted, but I wouldn't want to bet"on the outcome. 
Jack 
lfp/ss 9/20/74 
No. 73-762 SOSNA v. IOWA 
This case, on appeal from a three-judge court, was noted 
to enable us - subject to a Younger question - to decide the 
durational residency requirement issue with respect to divorce 
laws which is now being litigated in a number of states. 
Iowa, which has a liberal "no fault" relatively new 
divorce law, has a one-year residency requirement reading as 
follows: 
"Except where the respondent is a resident of 
the state and is served by personal service, 
the petitioner for dissolution of divorce 
..• must state that petitioner has been for 
the last year a resident of the state ... " 
§ 598.6 Iowa Code. 
Appellant 
Raxxxx:m1ax, Carol Sosna, married in Michigan in 1964, 
resided in New York - as a marital domicile - until August 
1972, moved to Iowa in August 1972 for no reason other than 
that she"had friends" living there. She had no previous 
connection with the state. One month later, she instituted 
a divorce suit in an Iowa county court; her husband, still 
living in New York but happened to be caught in Iowa on a 
visit and personally served, filed a special appearance on 
the ground that the Iowa court lacked basic jurisdiction 
in view of the residency requirements. The state court agreed 
with the husband and dismissed the petition. 
Appellant, without taking any appeal to the Iowa Supreme -,Court, brought a class action suit in the federal court, and 
a three-judge district court was convened to consider her 
2. 
attack on the constitutionality of the Iowa statute, enforce-
ment of which he wished to have permanently enjoined. There 
was a question of mootness resolved by the district court on 
the ground that this was a class action involving an issue 
likely to reoccur. 
A majority of the three-judge court sustained the validity 
of the Iowa statute, distinguishing Dunn and Shapiro: 
"We are not dealing here with the right to vote 
nor the privilege to receive welfare, as involved 
in Dunn and Shapiro. 
"Unlike voting or welfare, the concept of 
divorce is not a constitutional right, nor is it 
a basic necessity to survival ...• Divorce 
is wholly a creature of statute, with the absolute 
power to prescribe the condi tions relative thereto 
being vested in the state. See Pennoier v. Neff, 
95 U.S. 714, 734-35. --
Discussion 
Without attempting any detailed or systematic analysis, 
I now record - as I scan the opinions and the briefs - some 
of my reactions. 
The issue seems to me to be close and difficult to 
resolve on a basis consistent with the various interests 
involved, and our precedents. It is an issue of widespread 
current interest, as evidenced by the fact that since 1971 -
according to appellee's brief, 14 cases in state and federal 
courts have addressed the validi~ of these statutes, with 
nine upholding them and five ~ m u~ onstitutional. (Appel lee's 
\ 
Btief, p. 13-14) 
3. 
As would be expected (following Dunn and Shapiro), it is 
urged by appellant that the statute burdens interstate travel, 
that the state therefore must show a compelling justification 
for a classification of residence based on the duration of their 
residence, and that no such justification can be shown. There 
are pages of language from Dunn and Shapiro which, certainly 
if read out of context, abundantly support this line of attack. 
In addition to relying upon the equal protection clause, 
appellant argues - citing Boddie and also Vlandis - on the due 
process clause. Appellant asserts that a state is compelled 
to afford equal access to divorce to all of its citizens, and 
that the effect of the Iowa statute is to create an irrebutable 
presumption with respect to the bona fideness for divorce 
purpose of a residence. 
Interests of the State 
It is necessary, in every equal protection case, to 
identify - regardless of whether the compelling state interest 
or the rational basis test is applied - the state interests 
that are implicated. The majority opinion of the District Court 
focuses primarily on the traditional state interest in requiring 
a reasonable period of domicile within a state prior to divorce: 
"It was not the intent of the legislature to 
create in Iowa a virtual sanctuary for transient 
divorces based upon sham domiciles." (Jurisdictional 
Statement, Opinion of DC, p. 6) 
The majority opinion also relies upon the interest of 
the state in "conciliation", as the Iowa act provides for a 90-day 
4. 
conciliation period. 
If one looks at the majority and dissenting opinions alone, 
I find the dissent of Judge McMannus considerably sharper in 
its analysis than the majority opinion. The dissenting judge 
challenges, whether, in fact, the legitimate interest of 
avoiding a "divorce mill" is actually served by the state in 
question. The dissent argues that in any event this state 
interest could be vindicated by "less restrictive alternatives". 
The dissent further notes, what seems to me to be the most 
serious weakness in the Iowa statute, namely that it imposes 
no durational residency period at all where the respondent 
in the divorce suit is a resident of the state. Putting this 
differently, the Iowa statute applies where the respondent 
is not a resident of Iowa. It would thus be possible for one 
spouse to move into I owa and establish a bona fide residence 
there of very limited duration, and the other spouse, still 
residing out of Iowa could bring suit for divorce immediately 
thereafter. As I view this case at this time, the foregoing 
distinction between the plaintiff and defendant in divorce 
actions in Iowa is the most serious defect in the statute. 
But putting aside this defect, the ma·ority opinion did 
a...~~t.,t..,.. 
not make the strongest available for the constitutionality 
of this type of statute. Marriage, the marital relation, 
the children and property rights resulting from marriage, 
and the disposition of rights with respect to children and 
.'.> • 
property have been subjects of legitimate state interests from 
the beginning of our jurisprudence. Durational residency laws, 
to protect these state interests, have been traditional. We 
know from long experience in the divorce field (as well as 
other areas of the law) that residency and domicile are 
slippery concepts - despite the dissenting opinion~ view that 
the courts can be trusted to determine these. But once 
residency is established, divorces may be obtained on a 
ex parte basis with service by publication. The rights and 
interests of various parties and more than one state may well 
be involved. In this case, for example, the husband remained 
in New York. He had property there, there were three children 
of the marriage whom the mother had taken to Iowa (presumably 
without the consent of the father). If instant or brief 
residency is allowed, the rights of these parties in remote 
states - both as to custody and property - can be extinguished 
unless the spouse goes to the forum state (which may be 
entirely across the country) to defend his interests. The 
domiciliary state of the 11other party" to a divorce action 
therefore has a legitimate interest, as custody and property 
rights of its citizens may be affected by divorce in a 
foreign state. 
The foregoing interests are well summarized in a District 
Court opinion in Shiffman and Makres v. Askew, 359 F.Supp. 1225 
(1973), seep. 9, 10 of appellee's brief. As the District 
Court noted, the penalty to interstate travel (with respect -----
6. 
_/ 
to divorce) is de minimis . Certainly, divorce is not a matter 
of_Ehe same immediacy as exercising the right to vote in a 
particular election or receiving a welfare payment necessary 
to daily sustenance. Most people can and do await the judicial 
process, sometimes extending over months and years, prior to 
a final divorce. 
I doubt that the compelling state interest test is 
applicable to this type of durational residency requirement. 
If I am correct in this respect, the type of legitimate 
interest referred to by the Florida District Court seems 
adequate under the rational basis test. This would leave, 
however, the troublesome equal protection issue as to whether 
there is a legitimate state interest in the distinction made 
between the residency requirements of a petitioner and a 
respondent in a divorce case. 
As to the "irrebutt able", due process argument, I have 
grave doubts as to the soundness of this as a constitutional 
theory. See my concurring opinion in the pregnant teacher 
cases. Nor do I think that Boddie is applicable, as the 
Iowa statute does not foreclose access to its courts: it 
merely defers them. This leaves for resolution the question 
whether the period of deferral is without a rational basis. 
While one can certainly argue, most plausibly, that a shorter 
say three months or six months 
periodtwould be adequate to assure bona fide residence, the 
question is whether the judicial branch should say that the 
legislature acted unconstitutionally in choosing one year. 
7. 
Younger Question 
I think this is a legitimate issue, as appellant xssk 
did not exhaust her state remedies. But appellee has conceded 
this issue. See appellee's miserably weak brief, p. 14. 
Court 
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of his contract. Thus, whether a par-
ticular teacher in a particular context 
has any right to such administrative 
hearing hinges on a question of state 
law. 
"Because the availability of the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to a pri-
or administrative hearing turns in 
each case on a question of state law, 
the issue of abstention will arise in 
future cases contesting whether a par-
ticular teacher is entitled to a hear-
ing prior to nonrenewal of his con-
tract. If relevant state contract law 
is unclear, a federal court should, in 
my view, abstain from deciding wheth-
er he is constitutionally entitled to a 
prior hearing, and the teacher should 
be left to resort to state courts on the 
questions arising under state law." 
408 U.S. at 603-604, 92 S.Ct. at 2717. 
This court has not been made aware of 
any ambiguity in Kentucky law concern-
ing implied contracts and will not de-
cline jurisdiction merely because a ques-
tion involving state law is presented. 
An order will be entered overruling 
defendants' motion to dismiss. 
Carol Maureen SOSNA, on behalr of her, 
self and all others similarly situ-
ated, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The STATE OF IOWA, and A. L Keck, 
Individually and as Judge of the Dis-
trict Court of the State of Iowa in and 
for Jackson County, Defendants. 
No. 73-C-1002-ED. 
United States District Court, 
N. D. Iowa, E. D. 
July 16, 1973. 
Wife who had resided in Iowa less 
than one year brought class action seek-
ing to have declared unconstitutional 
Iowa Dissolution of l\Iarriage Act sec-
tions imposing one-year residency re-
quirement and praying for injunction 
against further applications of such sec-
tions. The District Court, Stephenson, 
Circuit Judge, held that such sections 
are not unconstitutional as violative of 
right to petition for redress of griev-
ances under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments or as violative of right to 
travel freely from one state to another. 
Complaint dismissed. 
l\IcManus, Chief Judge, dissented 
and filed opinion. · 
I. Divorce ~1, 11 
Divorce is neither a constitutional 
right nor a basic necessity to survival, 
but rather is wholly a creature of stat-
ute, with absolute power to prescribe 
conditions relative thereto being vested 
in the state. 
2. Constitutional Law 
G=:>83(1), 91, 274.1(2) 
Iowa Dissolution of Marriage Act 
sections imposing one-year residency re-
q u ircment are not unconstitutional as vi-
olative of right to petition for redress of 
grievances under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments or as violative of 
right to travel freely from one state to 
another. LC.A. §§ 598.6, 598.9; U.S.C. 
A.Const. Amends. 1, 14. 
II. Edwin Simmers, P~ul E. Kempter, 
Dubuque, Iowa, for plaintiff. 
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., George 
W. l\Iurray Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Des 
Moines, Iowa, for defendants. 
Before STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge, 
lVIcMANUS and HANSON, Chief Dis-
trict Judges. 
STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff, Carol Maureen · Sosna, is 
presently a resident of Green Island, 
Jackson County, Iowa. She has resided 
there since August 1972, prior to which 
she resided in the State of New York. 
She was married to respondent, l\Iichael 
SOSNA v. STATE OF IOWA 
Cite ns 300 F.Supp. 1182 (1973) 
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Sosna, on September 5, 1964 in the State 
of l\Iichigan. 
In September 1972, plaintiff institut-
ed marriage dissolution proceedings 
against respondent, a non-resident, in 
the District Court of Iowa, Jackson 
County, pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 
598. Iowa Code § 598.6 (1971),1 re-
quires a one year Iowa residency by a 
petitioner when the respondent is a 
non-resident. By order dated December 
27, 1972, the Honorable A. L. Keck, a 
co-defendant herein, in ruling on a spe-
cial appearance of respondent, dismissed 
the petition pursuant to Iowa Code § 
598.9 ( 1971) 2 for want of jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff now brings ti.;;; class action 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, and seeks 
to have §§ 598.6 and 598.9 (1971) de-
clared unconstitutional as violative of 
her right to petition for redress of 
grievances under the First Amendment? 
the Fourteenth Amendment,4 and in vio-
lation of her right to travel freely from 
one state to another insofar as it impos-
es a one year durational residency re-
quirement. She also prays for an in-
junction against its further applications. 
A three-judge district court was con-
vened to consider the merits of this 
cause. See, 28 U.S.C. § 2281.5 
"[D]urational residence laws must be 
measured by a strict equal protection 
I. Iown (',ode § u98.6 (1971) reeds 118 fol-
lows: 
"Exc:evt wloere the respondent is a 
resident o( this stnte nnd is sen·ed by 
perso1rnl ,spn·ice, the ))Ptitiou fo1· dissolu-
tion of marriage, in addition to setting 
forth the informntion required b,I' section 
59S.G, must state that the pC'titionrr has 
been for the last Y<'llr a resident o( th e 
state, SJH!cit\i11g the county in wlli<·h 
the petitioner . has resided, and the lengl11 
of suc·lt resitlence therein nftci· derlu<'ting 
nil abscnres from the st:ttf'; nu,1 that 
the mainteuan<'e of the resi,lrn,·e hns been 
in ,:;ood fa~th llnd not for the 1m rpose of 
ohtnining a marria,:;c dissolution unly." 
2. Iowa Co<le § ::i9S.9 (]971) n•ads ns 
follows: 
''If the nvcrme11ts as to resi,knec arc 
not fully pro\'ed, tlic he:u·iug sl,ull pro-
eee,I no funl,er, and the nc·tion be clis-
misseJ by the <..-ourt." 
test: they are unconstitutional unless 
the State can demonstrate that such 
Jaws are 'necessary to promote a compel-
ling governmental interest.'" Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342, 92 S.Ct. 
995, 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 
S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). 
We are not dealing here with the 
right to vote nor the privilege to receive 
welfare as involved in Dunn, supra and 
Shapiro, supra. In Dunn, the Court 
held that a durational residency require-
ment imposed under Tennessee law 
which precluded newcomers from voting 
was not necessary to further a compel-
ling state interest. With emphasis 
placed upon the difference between bona 
fide residence requirements and dura-
tional residence requirements, the Court 
noted that new residents as a group may 
be less informed relative to state and lo-
cal issues than older residents, and that 
durational residency requirements will 
exclude some uninformed new residents. 
H concluded, however, that ". as 
devices to limit the franchise to knowl-
edgeable residents, the conclusive pre-
sumptions of durational residence re-
quirements are much too crude. 
They represent a requirement 
of knowledge unfairly imposed on only 
some citizens." The basic constitutional 
right to vote, therefore, could not be an-
3. U.S.Const. Amcn<l. I. 
4. Id., Amend. Xl\'. 
5. \Ye note at the outset that termination 
of plaintiff's deferral period, iu Augu st 
of 1973, would not render this case 
moot since tl,c <'Buse before us is a <:lass 
action an,l tlte court is confronted with 
tlte reasonable likelihood tiiat tl,c Jlroblcm 
will o •rur to members of the class of 
which 11laintiff is currently a member. 
,<;;ee, Hall v. Beals, 3fJG U.S. 4G, 4S-49, 
90 S.Ct. 200, 202, 24 L.Ed.2<l 214 
(1.969) ; llll(] romvarc with, :Railey v. 
PatterHon, ::JG9 'C.S. 3], 32-33, 82 , '.Ct. 
540, G!:iO, 7 L .E1l.::!<l 512 (1962) ; .<ee also, 
Hoc ,·. "'ndc, 410 U.S. 11:3, 124- 12;:i, 
03 S.Ct. 70.\ 712- 713, 35 L.E<l.2cl 147 
(1973). 
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nulled where the "relationship between 
the state interest in an informed elector-
ate" and the one year residency require-
ment demonstrated "simply too attenuat-
ed a relationship." Dunn v. Blumstein, 
supra, 405 U.S. 330, 359-360, 92 S.Ct. 
995, 1012 (1972). 
In Shapiro, the Court noted that the 
record reflected "weighty evidence" that 
the main thrust of the durational resi-
dency requirement in issue was to ex-
clude from that jurisdiction the poor 
who needed or would probably need re-
lief. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 
U.S. 618, 628, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328, 22 L. 
Ed.2d 600 (1969). In declaring the wel-
fare residency requirement unconstitu-
tional, the Court reasoned that implicit 
in any attempt to restrain potential wel-
fare recipients from entering a state, 
when the motivating factor of the indi-
gents is to seek higher benefits, is the 
notion that this class of indigents is 
"less deserving than indigents who do 
not take this consideration into account." 
Id. 394 U.S. 618, 631-632, 89 S.Ct. 
1322, 1330. The net effect of the re-
quirement was the creation of two class-
es of indigents-the sole distinction 
being a residency requirement which de-
nied the newcomers the very means to 
obtain their subsistence. Id., 394 U.S. 
618, 627, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327. 
Furthermore, the Court expressly 
stated in Shapiro that it did not purport 
to outlaw summarily all duration resi-
dency requirements. 
"We imply no view of the validity of 
waiting-period or residence require-
ments determining eligibility to vote, 
eligibility for tuition-free education, 
to obtain a license to practice a pro-
fession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. 
Such requirements may promote com-
pelling state interests on the one 
hand, or, on the other, may not be 
penalties upon the exercise of the con-
stitutional right of interstate travel." 
6. ;:Jee, Botl<lie v. Conne<:titut, ·101 U.R. 
371, 91 S.Ct. 7SO, '.2S L.Ed.'.2d 1J3 (1!.)71), 
in whiL"h tho Supreme Court held tlint due 
process prohibits uuy stute from denying 
394 U.S. 618, 638 n. 21, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 
1333 n. 21. 
[1] Unlike voting or welfare, the 
concept of divorce is not a constitutional 
right, nor is it a basic necessity to sur-
vival. See, Whitehead v. Whitehead, 492 
P.2d 939, 945 (Hawaii 1972); accord, 
Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St.2d 155, 
291 N.E.2d 530, 533 (1972). Divorce is 
wholly a creature of statute, with the 
absolute power to prescribe the condi-
tions relative thereto being vested in the 
state.6 See, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714, 734-735, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877). 
It is significant to note in this connec-
tion that the Iowa Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act is based upon a "no-fault" 
concept of divorce. See, 20 Drake L. 
Rev. 211 (1971). While this innovative 
reform promotes a more harmonious dis-
solution of a marital breakdown, cf., In 
re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 
339, 342 (Iowa 1972), it was not the in-
tent of the legislature to create in Iowa 
a virtual sanctuary for transient di-
vorces based upon sham domiciles. To 
the contrary, Iowa law favors the pres-
ervation of marriage ,vhenever possible, 
as evidenced by the ninety-day concilia-
tion period of the new Iowa act. The 
period is mandatory unless waived by 
, the court upon a showing of good cause.7 
Moreover, the deferral period may well 
foster a re-examination of marriage so 
that a couple might determine whether 
the move itself has helped restore tran-
quility to their estranged relationship. 
Place v. Place, 129 Vt. 326, 278 A.2d 
710, 711-712 (1971); accord, Coleman v. 
Coleman, supra, 32 Ohio St.2d 155, 291 
N.E.2d 530, 535 (1972). It also serves 
to discourage Iowa from unnecessarily 
interfering with a marital relationship 
between non-residents in which it has no 
interest. 
[2] Based upon the foregoing, with 
particular consideration being given to 
imligents n\'cess to its dirnrce courts 
solely heranse of inability to JlflY court 
cost~. 
7. Iowa Code § 5!)$,16 (1D7l). 
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the power of a state to regulate its own 
laws governing marriage and its dissolu-
tion, Pennoyer v. Neff, suvra, 95 U.S. 
714, 734-735, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877); nc-
cord, Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401 
U.S. 371, 376, 91 S.Ct. 780, 785, 28 L. 
Ed.2d 113 (1971), we arc convinced that 
Iowa's interest in establishing a one-
year deferral period 8 is sufficiently 
compelling to render §§ 598.6 and 598.9 
of the 1971 Iowa Code constitutionally 
permissible.9 
Mc MANUS, Chief Judge ( dissent-
ing): 
I am compelled to dissent. In my 
view the majority's analysis of the con-
stitutional issues involved is deficient. 
They incorrectly restrict the right to 
travel rationale, improperly apply the 
strict equal protection te,1t and ignore 
the due process/access to the courts ar-
gument. 
Citing Dunn v. Blumstein and Shapiro 
v. Thompson, suvra, the majority con-
cedes that durational residence require-
ments must be "measured by a strict 
equal protection test." From that point, 
however, the thrust of the opinion seems 
to be an attempt to distinguish the resi-
dence laws at issue in Dunn and Shaviro 
from that at issue here. Great emphasis 
is placed upon the fact that Dunn in-
volved the right to vote and Sha11iro the 
right to welfare benefits, while this case 
involves only divorce, "not a constitu-
tional right, nor a basic neces-
sity to survival." The purpose of this 
distinctjon is unclear, but it appears to 
8. ~f'C, "'liitel,end v. ".hitclll'a,l, .s111wa, 4!l'.! 
l'.2d !J:-l!l, 948 (Hawnii ]972J, i11sofar ns 
it Stfltcs that there is no mntcrinl ,li(-
feren,·e bet wPen the rrsJl(•et i ,·e Jit•riods 
of rcsi<len,·c J)resnilwrl by tlurntion nl 
residency, r,,quir<'nw11ts whe ther th<• 
pf'rio,l ht> onP .n•:i r or 11incty ,lnys. "If 
u l)rf'.~r·rilwtl ppriod of one y<'ar ,li N-
<·rirninutC's against re<·t'nt n•!-ildt~nts, ~o 
doe5 :t prc~,·rilwd period o( ninety clnys.' ' 
9. In 8hapirt,, .rnpra., ::191 u.S. Gl,'<, (\;lJ. 
8!1 S.C't. n22, 13'.!!), '.!2 L. E,1.2(! GOO 
(]HG!l). the <'our!. stati•d thnt "li]f a 
law li:l8 'no other purpose * * * 
than to <'hill rite nsscrtion o( r·onstitn-
360 F.Supp.-75 
he a justification for utilizing some uni-
dentified test, less stringent than strict 
equal protection. Although the majority 
does offer several purportedly "compel-
ling" justifications for the discrimina-
tory classifications inherent in section 
598.6 of the Iowa Code, the record is de-
void of evidence to support these justifi-
cations, since the state produced abso-
lutely no evidence. See Dunn, supra·, 
405 U.S. at 346, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 
274. Also the majority never expressly 
recognizes the necessity for considering 
less onerous alternatives when applying 
the "strict equal protection test." Ac-
cordingly, I deem it necessary to set 
forth what I consider to be the appro-
priate constitutional analysis mandated 
by the relevant case law. 
It can no longer be disputed that the 
right to unhindered interstate travel and 
settlement, in and of itself, is a funda-
mental right guaranteed by the constitu-
tion of the United States. Dunn v. 
Blumstein, supra, at 338, 92 S.Ct. 995 
(1972); Oregon v. l\Iitchell, 400 U.S. 
112, 237, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 
272 (separate opinion of Brennan, White 
and Marshall, JJ.), 285- 286 (Stewart, 
J., concurring and dissenting, with whom 
Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined) 
(1970). Shapiro v. Thompson, suvra, 
394 U.S. at 629-631, 89 S.Ct. J 322, 22 L. 
Ed.2d 600 (1969); United States v. 
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 
16 L.Ed.2d 239 ( 1966). It is also clear 
that section 598.6 of the Iowa Code is a 
durational residence requirement which 
penalizes only petitioners who have re-
tionnl rigl,ts by penalizing those who 
,·hos<• to exer,·i~<' tl1<'m, then it [isl patent-
ly Ull('OllStitutionul.'" 1·11ite,l StRt PS V .
. T:l,·kson, 390 U.~. f.i7O, fi,<~J, SS S.C't. ]20!l, 
1:!lfl, 20 L.E,1.2,l 13S (l!lfiS). 
'l'hf' \'ermont t·ourt in f'ln<·r v . Plate, 
811/11'(1, 12!) \'t. 320, 278 .\.2<1 7)0, 711 
(]!J,1), not ed in rcsJ)onsc to the forc-
l;t>ing passage: "This is <lf'sperntelr thin 
guidam·t•. A 11umher of intnstntc 1lif-
fcrc11tinls spring- 10 mirnl tl,at quite ecr-
iainl_v <·hill d,nngc of rcsir]('rl(·c, ~ueh as, 
for l'XHmJ)lP, th1• J)rcs,'ll<·<' of a stnrc in-
('0me tux, the rncasurl' of unc111ploy1 ,v•nt 
bcnefit8, the P~t•·nt of public snpportcd 
cducutiou, to nu111r but a few.'' 
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cently exercised the right to interstate 
migration. The majority's attempt to 
distinguish Dunn and Shapiro seems un-
founded in view of the explicit language 
in Dunn wherein the court stated that 
"whether we look to the benefit withheld 
by the classification (the opportunity to 
vote) or the basis for the classification 
( recent interstate travel) we conclude 
that the State must show a substantial 
and compelling reason for imposing du-
rational residence requirements." Id, 
405 U.S. at 335, 92 S.Ct. at 999. 
The standard, therefore, that must be 
applied in determining the constitution-
ality of sections 598.6 and 598.9 of the 
Iowa Code (1971) is the strict equal 
protection test. Under this test the bur-
den is on the state to demonstrate that 
(1) the classification serves a compel-
ling state interest, and (2) that no less 
restrictive alternatives are available to 
the state. As the court stated in Dunn, 
"It is not sufficient for the State to 
show that durational residence require-
ments further a very substantial state 
interest. In pursuing that important in-
terest, the State cannot choose means 
that unnecessarily burden or restrict 
constitutionally protected activity." Id, 
at 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1003; see Oregon v. 
I. '!'lie limited dass ification whil'l1 § :i9S.G 
creatrs also appears violative of the E()ual 
Protection Clnnse due to its arbitrary 
imposition of a one-year resiclrney require-
ment where the prtitioner is a resirleut 
au<l the r·esponilent is not, without i111 -
posini; the same rPquirrment in similar 
situations sneh ns where the respotHlent 
resides in Iowa and the 11et itioner rlor s 
not. Sec l., nite,l States Dcp't. of Agri<'ul-
ture v. ~Ioreno. - U.~. -. 93 RCt. 
2 21, 37 L.Ed.2d 7S2 (l!l,;}). The arbi-
trariness of the scheme is illustrntNl by th e 
ea~e with which tli,·on·es can br obtninNl 
under the 11resent ~ta tntP through the 
use of sham re~i<lences. For cxumple, 
"if both 11nrties desire the divorce flll(l 
ure willing to ('O-operate, it is possible 
to aYoicl the establishmen t of 'resirl,•nee' 
in Iowa. All that the Jlllrti cs 
need do is fulsifr th eir prtition for dirnr<'l' 
to the effect that the (lcfen1lunt is fl 
res i1len t of thf' state-a statement whic·h 
the Iowa courts apparently arc unwilling 
to sc:rutiniz,,." Xote. ~ome Problefns 1:n-
<l er Iowa's Jutliciul Juristlietion Statutes, 
Mitchell, supra, 400 U.S. at 237, 239, 91 
S.Ct. 260; Shapiro v. Thompson, siwm, 
394 U.S. at 634-638, 89 S.Ct. 1322; N. 
A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 
S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1962) ; Wyme-
lenberg v. Syman, 328 F.Supp. 1353 (K 
D.Wisc.1971). See also Whitehead v. 
Whitehead, 492 P.2d 939, 948 (Hawaii 
1972) (Levinson, J., dissenting). 
As the first "compelling" justification 
for section 598.6, the majority has found 
that it serves to prevent Iowa from be-
coming "a virtual sanctuary for tran-
sient divorces based upon sham 
domiciles."1 This finding completely 
avoids the basic issue. Admittedly, 
Iowa has a legitimate interest in not be-
coming a "divorce mill." The critical 
question, however, is whether this inter-
est is served by denying bona fide resi-
ents of the state the right to seek a 
dissolution.2 In creating an irrebutta-
ble presumption against recently arrived 
residents, the Iowa law sweeps too 
broadly since there are less restrictive 
alternatives available to the state. In 
my opinion, the Iowa judiciary is per-
fectly competent to determine whether 
the residence of a petitioner has been 
maintained in good faith and not for the 
purpose of obtaining a dissolution.3 
48 Iowa L .Ue\'. 9GS, 982 (]OG::l). ,\rl-
rlitiouall.r, without nretling to fahify thP. 
pet ition. thr r~sponrle11t ,·ouhl actually 
move iuto Iowa an,.1 t hf' pet itioner f'Oulrl 
immed iatrl.,· file for <liYorcr c ,·,-n though 
not n rrsid en t. 'l'hus , in ad1litio11 to be-
ing l'iolativc of the Equal Protection 
Clause 1lne to its nrbitrnrint•ss, § ii!)~.H 
also appen rs to make Iowa su bjrct to hc-
comini; a ''diY01·cr mill" even with its 
one-year resi1lcnL·Y requirement in the Jirn -
iterl s ituation brfore the <'ourt . ,, 
2 . It is c-lear frorn the cl'i,lcn('e tha t tlw 
plaintiff is n bona fole rcsi1l en~ of the 
8tate and not here merely for the purpo8t· 
of obtaining n 11H1rriag"' di •::--nlution. 
3. Arlequntc protP<:tion "1>uld be nffor<l cd 
by limiting aeccss to clbsolution to those 
who arc perm:1111:nt or bom1 fide n•sillents 
or clorniciliaries of the statP, llll'Hnini:: those 
pl,y,;icnlly presPnt in tl,e ~tate with intl'11t 
to make it their liomr. 'l'hc bunlcu to es-
tahlish such would be on the petitioner. 
Sec Dunn, supra, at 313-33-1, 92 S.Ct. 
903. '·[::;Juch oujrcti\'C imlic in. of bona 
~--
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Neither the specter of perjury nor the 
argument for administrative convenience 
is :,;upportive of the majority's position 
or sufficient to justify the durational 
residence requirement in question. See 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 
2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (June 1973); Dunn, 
.m.vra, 405 U.S. at 345-354, 92 S.Ct. 995; 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 
381-382, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 
(1971); Shapiro, supra, 394 U.S. at 633, 
89 S.Ct. 1322; Carrington v. Rash, 380 
U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 
(1965). As stated in Dunn, supra, 405 
U.S. at 351-352, 92 S.Ct. at 1007-1008, 
"The State's legitimate purpose is to 
determine whether certain persons in 
the community arc bona fide resi-
dents. A durational residence re-
quirement creates a dassification that 
may, in a crude way, exclude nonresi-
dents from that group. But it also 
excludes many residents. Given the 
State's legitimate purpose and the in-
dividual interests that are affected, 
the classification is all too imprecise. 
In general, it is not very 
difficult for Tennessee to determine 
on an individualized basis whether one 
recently arrived in the community is 
in fact a resident, although of course 
there will always be difficult cases. 
fide rrsidencr as a dwellin!!;, ,·nr r!'gistra-
tion, or drh·er's license," amr,ug other 
things, prodde au mlequale basis for n 
judiciul determination of bona fide resi-
dence. D111111, s11pra, at 352, 92 S.Ct. at 
1008. 
4. Although it !111s not been urgP<l hy the 
)Jlnintiff, it appears tl1nt the "irrehutta\Jle 
,,resumption" crC'ate<l by section G!lS.G is 
also suuje<·t to atta('k on 1lur vro<>rss 
groumls in Yiew of Ylnntlis \". Klinr, 
.supra. Sec also 8tanTey ,·. Jllinois, 405 
U.S. G4:i. 92• S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.'.:!d 531 
(1972) ; Bell ,·. Burson, 402 t ·.s. :i:ti, !)1 
S.Ct. lGSG, 2n L.Ed.2d !JO (197J) ; l lei11er 
v. Donnnn, 2SG G.S. 8J2, :i2 S.Ct. :JGS, 7G 
L.Ed. 77:! (J !)J2). Srwakin.; for the 
majority, Justice ~tf'wart fournl 1hat a 
"ricrmanent irrcbntnble pr\'snmption of 
no1uc;,itl,•nce is Yioln1i\·e of the 
Dne Prricess Clause, because it pr-ovicl,·s 
no opportunity for btuclents . to 
But since Tennessee's pre-
sumption from failure to meet the du-
rational residence requirements is con-
clusive, a showing of actual bona fide 
residence is irrelevant, even though 
such a showing ,vould fully serve the 
State's purposes embodied in the pre-
sumption and would achieve those pur-
poses with far less drastic impact on 
constitutionally protected interests."4 
With regard to the other reasons ad-
vanced by the majority in support of § 
598.6, I am convinced that they do not 
serve any compelling state interest. Ini-
tially, the majority states that the one-
year "deferral period may well foster a 
re-examination of marriage so that a 
couple might determine whether the 
move itself has helped restore tranquili-
ty to their estranged relationship." 
This reasoning, however, completely ig-
nores the fact that § 598.6 requires a 
one-year residency of a petitioner only 
in the limited situation where the re-
spondent docs not reside in Iowa.5 It is 
difficult to conceive how "a couple 
might determine whether the move itself 
has helped restore tranquility to their 
estranged relationship" when in fact 
they are living in different states. The 
majority's argument would be more 
plausible had the state seen fit to impose 
a one-year deferral period where both 
<lemonstrnte that they ha,·e become uona 
fide r<>sidents. 'l'he State can 
establish such rca~onable criteria for in-
state status as to make Yirtually certain 
tl,at students who are not, in fact, bonR 
fide residents of the State, lmt who have 
come there solely for educational purposes, 
cannot take nd,·antage of tlie in-state 
rates." 
Although the '•i rrebuttable presumption" 
in this <'flse is not p<'rmnnf'nt but only 
for one yf'ar, the state's denial of any 
opportunity 10 demonstrate bona fiue rrs-
iden<'e npp<"arn Yiolath·e of tlic <lue 1n·o<'css 
<:lause in view of the other nlternatin•s 
nvnil:.ible to the state. Sec D111111, s1111ra, 
403 U.S. nt 8G:2, 92 S.Ct. mm. 
5. § G!JS.G requires a <me-yc:u residency of 
a 1,etitioncr " [el X(:evt \\"hCr<' l"<'Siiornl<'nt is 
n resiclent of 11iis state nncl is scn·rc1 by 
per~onul ser\'iee, . 
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the petitioner and the respondent are 
residents of the state. 
The final state interest advanced by 
the majority is that the one-year defer-
ral period "serves to discourage Iowa 
from unnecessarily interfering with a 
marital relationship between non-resi-
dents in which it has no interest." This 
argument, however, ignores the fact that 
in the case of a bona fide resident, the 
state does have an interest in the mar-
riage relationship regardless of whether 
the petitioner has been in Iowa for one 
year. Additionally, the argument ig-
nores the fact that Iowa imposes no one-
year deferral period in the situation 
where the respondent has recently moved 
to Iowa and the petitioner still lives in 
another state. The unnecessary inter-
ference in that situation, if any, would 
appear to be no different than in the 
present case. 
Finally, the majority has ignored the 
due process/access to the courts concept 
enunciated in Boddie v. Connecticut, su-
pra. Contrary to the majority's conten-
tion that "divorce is wholly a creature 
of statute, with the absolute power to 
prescribe the conditions relative thereto 
being vested in the state", and recogniz-
ing that marriage is a fundamental hu-
man relationship involving interests of 
basic importance in our society, the 
court in Boddie held that a state may 
not, consistent with the obligations im-
posed by the Due Process Clause, deny 
one class of citizens access to the proce-
dures for adjusting that relationship, 
absent a showing by the State of a suffi-
cient countervailing justification for 
that denial. Boddie, supra, 401 U.S. at 
380, 91 S.Ct. 780; Wymelenberg v. Sy-
man, supra; Whitehead v. Whitehead, 
supra. As with the filing fee require-
ment in Boddie, the durational residence 
requirement of § 598.6 denies one class 
of citizens access to the only procedure 
available for obtaining a dissolution. 
As a result, the state must show a suffi-
cient countervailing justification for its 
restriction on plaintiff's right to access 
to the courts to dissoh·e her marriage, 
which it totally failed to do. 
For the above reasons I am of the 
view that the state has shown no suffi-
cient countervailing justification to sup-
port its one-year residence requirement 
in light of the alternatives available. 
w~----.. 
0 ~ KEY NU"19ER SYSTEM 
T 
In the matter of the complaint of LYRA 
SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD., as owner 
of the l.U/S GALAXY FAITH, for Exon-
eration from, or Limitation of Liability. 
Civ. A. Nos. 72-1010, 72-973, 72-992 
and 72-1215. 
United States District Court, 
E. D. Louisiana, 
Section "E". 
July 2, 1973. 
Actions arising out of collision which 
took place in canal locks and which in-
volved defendant's vessel. On such own-
er's motion for summary judgment, the 
District Court, Cassibry, J., held that 
owners of another vessel, which, togeth-
er with its tow, was required to use an-
other route, could recoYer damages for 
additional expenses, that corporation, 
which contracted to have company trans-
port feed stock by most direct water 
route, was entitled to recoup from de-
fendant owner for any freight and de-
murrage charges for which corporation 
was liable to· company, and that damage~ 
sustained by another vessel and its tow 
were too remote to subject defendant 
owner to liability. 
Motion denied in part and granted 
in part. 
1. Collision c=:, 129 
Owners of vessel, which, together 
with its tow, ,vas required to use anoth-
er route because of collision in canal 





Mr. Justice Powell 
David Boyd 
DATE: October 14, 1974 
No. 73-762 Sosna v. Iowa 
This case comes to this Court on appeal from a three-judge 
court determination that Iowa's one year durational residency 
qualification on resort to the State's divorce laws was not 
in violation of the First Amendment and the due process and 
s 
equal protection clauses of the United States Contitution. 
Sosna v. State of Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Iowa 1973). 
The Court additionally requested that the parties address the 
question of abstention, an issue that appellee Iowa now 
concedes. 
The Iowa Statutory Scheme: 
In 1970 Iowa adopted a system of "no fault" divorce. 
Under current Iowa law, one desiring a divorce need only allege 
that "there has been a breakdown in the marriage relationship 
to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have 
been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that 
the marriage can be preserved." Iowa Code Ann. § 598.5(7). 
The I owa r evision did not result in a significant 
alteration of the State's residency requirement, however. 
The State continues to require that a divorce petitioner 
specifically plead and prove by competent evidence, id., 
2. 
§§ 598.6; 598.7, that he has maintained a residence in the 
State for one year a~d that the maintenance of that residence ------has been "in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining 
a marriage dissolution only." Id. § 598.6. 
The statutory scheme thus places a one year dura tional 
residency requirement on divorce petitioners seeking to 
dissolve a marri age with a respondent who is not an I owa 
resident. If the respondent is an Iowa resident, however, 
the divorce petitioner is not held to this requirement. Thus, 
although appellant Sosna must satisfy the one year durational 
requirement to divorce her husband, the husband could gain 
access to the State courts upon the allegation and proof that 
1 
appellant Sosna is an Iowa resident. 
The Propriety of Federal Abstention: 
The Court requested that the parties address the question 
c..t)lL .,/ 
of federal abstention, an issue that the district could had 
previously rejected. Appellant devotes most of her attention 
to the question of the applicability of Younger-type abstention, 
~ ssue that is largely irrelevant, and appellees now wish to 
" _,,,,.- concede that abstention was not required in this context. 
I think that appellees are correct; abstention clearly 
should not be required in this case. This case does not place -
1. The dissenting judge observed that it was clear that 
appellant Sosna was a bona fide resident of Iowa and had not 
, moved to the State merely for the purpose of obtaining a 
marriage dissolution. 360 F. Supp. at 1186, n. 2. 
3. 
the federal courts in a posture in which a federal ruling might 
disrupt the administration of the State's criminal laws. Thus, 
the concerns that underlie Younger-type abstention speak with 
a muted voice. Neither does the case appear to present any of 
the circumstances that have prompted abstention in the civil 
context. The most common kind of abstention in the context of 
State civil law is Pullman-type abstention, Railroad Commission 
of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), which requires 
that the federal courts withhold a ruling to enable the parties 
to obtain a State ruling on a difficult and unsettled question 
of State law that might prove dispositive, or at least 
significant, to the federal question. In this case, the 
challenged State statutes are clear and straightforward. 
Pullman-type abstention would not seem appropriate. Cf. Public 
Utilities Comm. of Calif. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958). 
Nor does this case appear to present a situation for Buford-type 
abstention. Buford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). This 
issue does not enmesh the federal courts in a complex area of 
State regulatory law where the parties can obtain "adequate 
state court review of an administrative order based upon 
predominately local factors." Alabama Public Service Com. v. 
Southern R. Co. 341 U.S. 349 (1951). 
This case presents a challenge to a clear and unambiguous 
State durational requirement. There appears to be little or 
no prospect that State interpretation of its law would alter 
the character of the federal question. In this context, 
~-
4. 
"abstention" would really be "exhaustion," and that should not 
be required. See Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1255 (M.D. 
Fla. 1973) (3 Judge court). 
Equal Protection: The Right to Travel 
You indicated a disinclination for extending the compelling 
state interest concept unnecessarily, expressing a conviction 
that a better solution would be to apply a rational basis test 
more critically. As your room for maneuver in this area has 
been somewhat circumscribed by prior opinions, I will begin by 
identifying the extent of this commitment. 
Dictum in your Rodriguez opinion clearly commits you to 
the position that the right to interstate travel is "an establish-
ed constitutional right," and that the Court's application of 
the compelling interest test in that case was proper. See 
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 
quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (Stewar, J., 
concurring), see also Rodriguez, supra, at 32, n. 71. Additionally, 
you have acknowledged the validity of the most demanding portion 
of the compelling interest test, the least restrictive means 
requirement. Rodriguez, supra, at 17, citing and quoting Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). You applied that portion 
of the compelling interest test in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 
717 (1973), and chided the majority for failure to apply it 
in Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 763 (1973) (dissenting 
opinion). 
5. 
As you recognized in your initial memorandum for this case, 
the most often fatal portion of the compelling interest test llS 
the requirement that governments protect compelling interests in 
a manner that exacts a minimum cost on constitutionally protected 
interests. Not surprisingly, the least restrictive means require-
ment poses the most difficult question in this case. 
Only two courses appear to offer an alternative to invalida-
tion of virtually all durational residency limitations on access 
to States' divorce laws. The first, a course identified by 
Justice Marshall in Memorial County v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 
250 (1974), is to limit the applicability of the compelling 
interest test to cases involving limitations on the right of 
interstate travel. A second possibility, less likely to attract 
a Court, is to begin to infuse some considerations of administra-
tive feasibility in the determination whether the State has 
chosen the least restrictive means of protecting compelling 
2 
interests. While I think you should be careful not to 
foreclose tha)you should be careful not to foreclose the 
latter course, I will concentrate on the former. 
2. You retain some degree of flexibility in this regard. 
In Weber you recognized the problems posed by difficulties of 
proof, see 406 U.S. at 174-75. Your dissent in Rosario recognizes 
the possibility of a "reasonable enrollment deadline" that might 
protect against most of the problems there considered. See 410 
U.S. at 711. And you joined a phr curiam opinion in Mars ton 
v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) tat upheld a 50-day durational 
residency and registration requirement for voting in other 
than presidential elections. 
~· 
6. 
Justice Marshall's opinion in Maricopa provides an initial 
and tentative foundation for limitation of the impact of the 
Shaprio rationale on various kinds of durational residency 
requirements. In Maricopa at least five members of the Court 
viewed Shapiro as a case turning on the penal nature of the 
3 
durational residency requirement. See 415 U.S. at 259. Given 
the way votes have fallen on other equal protection cases, I 
suspect that there are a potential eight votes for limitation 
of broadest portions of the Shaprio and Dunn rationale. 
Justice Marshall begins by noting that Shaprio did not 
declare all durational residency requirements to be per se 
unconstitutional. Although all such requirements impinge 
"to some extent on the right to travel. Justice Marshall 
observed that the "amount of impact required to give rise to 
the compelling-state-interest test was not made clear." 415 
U.S. at 256-57. 
Although Justice Marshall recognized that Shapiro had 
spoken both in terms of deterring interstate migration and of 
imposing a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel, 
he quickly dismissed the former. He implied that any deterrent 
effect on the right to travel caused constitutional problems 
3. Justice Marshall's opinion was joined by yourself and 
Justices Brennm.., Stewart and White. Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Blackmun concurred separately without stating any 
reasons. Justice Douglas concurred for reasons that are only 
partially intelligible to me, and Justice Rehnquist dissented. 
7. 
and further noted that neither Shapiro nor Dunn had required 
proof of deterrence by actual evidence. In Justice Marshall's 
view, Shapiro is a case that turns on a "penalty analysis." 
Id. at 259. Viewed in these terms, he described Dunn as a 
case involving the deprivat:i.:_on of the franchise, "a fundamental 
Cl~ cue~ ,~wo Iv,~ 
political right," and Shapiro and Maricopa ••illalAdeprivations 
of the "basic necessities of life." Id. Lower tuition costs in -
State institutions of higher education, by contrast, was not 
an interest of such importance, and thus the Court had permitted 
..__ 
a one year durational residency requirement that imposed higher 
tuition costs on persons who had recently migrated to the State. 
Id. See also id. at 260, n. 15. 
It thus appears that the applicability of the compelling 
interest test to durational residency requirement limitations 
on access to a State forum for divorce will depend on the 
/" 
Court's assessment of the importance of that right. Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) makes it difficult to denigrate 
the importance of access to a divorce forum. In determining 
that a State could not restrict access to its courts for purposes 
of divorce solely on the basis of inability to pay, Justice 
Harlan . observed that the State courts afforded the only 
available means for dissolution of marriage . and compared the 
plight of an indigent deprived 0£ access to the State divorce 
forum to that of a criminal defendant who is placed at a 
disadvantage due to indigency. He further noted that acess 
to a judicial forum was, in the context of divorce,an "exclusive 
8. 
precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relation-
ship." Id. at 383. The Court subsequently emphasized the 
importance of access to a judicial forum for obtaining a divorce 
in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). Distinguishing 
that from access to a judicial forum for the purpose of resolution 
of questions of bankruptcy, Justice Blackmun observed: 
The denial of access to a judicial forum in Boddie 
touched directly, as he has noted, on the marital 
relationship and on the associational interests that 
surround the establishment and dissolution of that 
relationship. On many occasions we have recognized 
the fundamental importance of these interests under 
our Constitution •... The Boddie appellants' 
inability to dissolve their marriages seriously 
impaired their freedom to pursue other protected 
associational activities. 
490 U.S. at 445. In dissent, Justice Marshall emphasized the 
degree of importance the majority attributed to access to the 
judicial forum for obtaining a divorce. See 409 U.S. at 462, 
n. 4. Boddie and the dictum in Kras strongly suggest that 
access to a State forum for obtaining a divorce would number 
among those "right[s] to vital government benefits and privileges 
in the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other 
residents." Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 261. 
The consideration that you suggested in your preliminary 
memorandum indicates that the inquiry should not end with the 
simple citation of Boddie, however. That consideration centers 
around the varied and complex interests that are implicated by 
a State's determination to grant divorce. 
~-
As you mentioned in your memorandum, marriage and divorce 
implicate a vast range of socio-legal concerns, including property 
rights, rights to child custody, etc. Error in the satisfaction 
of one's marital obligations can lead to dire consequences, 
including actions for support or criminal prosecution for 
bigamy. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); 
325 U.S. 226 (1945). Moreover, the marriage relationship 
historically has been a matter of State concern. 
The marriage relationship is particularly unique in that 
a number of States may achieve some interest in a marriage 
entered into in another jurisdiction. More important for 
purposes of this discussion, States have the power to dissolve 
a marriage contract not initiated in their jurisdiction. This 
obviously creates a potential for creation of a considerable 
between States, especially where, as here, 
the State granting the divorce applies looser standards for 
determining its availability than does the other State that 
might retain some interest in the perpetuation of the marriage. 
The focal point of this potential friction is the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. 
In the context of divorce, the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
requires that one State honor a decree entered by a court of 
another state of competent jurisdiction, even though one of 
the parties to the marriage might reside in the first St ate 
and even though the first State might feel more of the 
potentially disruptive impact. The federal jurisdictional 
10. 
requirement for extension of full faith and credit to another 
State's divorce decree is simply that one of the parties to the 
decree have been domiciled in the granting State at the time 
ju.ri~iciui~ -lo i ~-s~ ~c dccn!e. atla.c.h~. 
eke @ccrce 'tf8:S iss:Yeel.A See, e.g., Williams I, 317 U.S. 287; 
Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175. Domicile, in turn, is "a rather 
elusive relation between person and place," Williams II, 325 
U.S. at 236 (Frankfurter, J.), centering around personal attach-
ment to a place with an intention of making it home either 
permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited period of time. 
Finally, one State's determination of domicile, and thus its 
power to grant divorce, can be examined by another itate that 
is called upon to grant full faith and credit to its judgment. 
States have two reciprocal interests in matters of divorce. 
First, each has an interest in the support of the legislative 
judgments that underlie its divorce statutes. When one State 
grants divorce on the basis of more liberal criteria than 
another, it can subvert the latter's divorce policy. Secondly, 
States have an interest in obtaining full faith and credit to 
their courts' decrees, which in the context of divorce turns 
on the establishment of domicile. And as the possibility that 
\, inc. r-e4:,e.. , So do , / 
one State's divorce will subvert another's policy! the chances 
of a refusal to honor that divorce • . 
The Court has previously recognized the special sensitivity 
of divorce, an area in which "the policy of each State in matters 
of most intimate concern could be subverted by the policy of 
every other State .• " Williams II, 325 U.S. at 231. And the 
11. 
jurisdictional requirement of domicile is the only factor that 
controls this potentially "destructive power." Id. As previously 
C\,\"'0"-11\d intt"'-it~ -to n.,'$ik ,i-\ ei~c. plo..ce, 
mentioned, the concept of domicile centersAfor an indefinite or 
permanent period of time. Durational residency requirements 
reflect a State's caution in extending its divorce forum to 
persons that might like to use it. And the reciproacl interests 
add some content to the State's fear of becoming a "divorce 
mill." The caution reflects both a concern for subverting 
the policies of other States and for maintaining the integrity 
of its judgments. This peculiar interstate sensitivity would 
seem to distinguish Boddie, Shapiro, and Dunn. In Boddie, the 
case involving State limitation of indigents' access to the 
divorce forum by imposition of fees, did not consider the 
potential for conflict between the policies of the State granting 
the divorce and other States that retained an interest in the 
marriage. And both Shapiro and Dunn were cases in which the 
relationship in question was one between one State and the 
individual. In~ her case was there a significant possibility I 
that the State's determination to grant or withhold the right 
would affect the interests of other States. 
An addi tional distinction might be drawn that rests on 
the irru:nediacy of the need. The need for irru:nediate welfare 
assistance in Shapiro is plain. The same can be said of the 
right to vote in a particular primary or election. As you 
observed in Rosario, "Deferment of a right, especially one as 
sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first duty of 
12. 
citizenship, can be tantamount to its denial." 410 U.S. at 
766. And Justice Marshall's analysis of Maricopa, emphasizing 
how denial of initial non-emergency medical care might lead to 
an emergency situation, can perhaps be squeezed into this 
framework. The need for immediate access to a forum for 
divorce is somewhat less apparent. Perhaps this case can be 
analogized to a six-month delay in qualification for the bar, 
or to a one-year delay in qualification for eligibility to 
receive in-state tuition, both of which have been summarily 
affirmed by the Court. Shuffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 
257 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Rose ,v. Bondurant, 409 
U.S. 1020 (1972); Starnes v. Malkerson, 226 F. Supp. 234 (D. 
Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971)0 
The combination of these factors appears to offer the 
strongest argument for refusing to apply the compelling interest 
test to State durational residency requirements limiting access 
to the State divorce forum. The fact that durational residency 
requirements for divorce reflect some concern for relations 
with other States suggests that perhaps the States should be 
given some leeway than the compelling interest test affords. 
And the diminished importance of immediacy suggests that the 
divorce petitioner would survive that accommodation. Whether 
the Court would buy this rationale in light of the clarity 
and strength of previous indications of the importance of 
access to the judicial forum for dissolution of the marriage 
relationship is not at all clear, however. 
13. 
The more one relies on the desire to afford States a 
degree of flexibility in determining to be cautious to accommodate 
the possible interests of other States, the less one can quibble 
over periods of durational time required. Strict adherence to 
this logic suggests that a one-year durational requirement 
would probably stand. Perhaps even the two-year requirement, ( 
at issue in the case here on appeal, Lorson v. Gallogly, 361 
F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1972), No. 73-678, would stand. But 
reliance on the diminished need for immediacy of relief imposes 
a qualification on the durational period that States might 
require. I tend to think that one year is too much, and I 
am more certain still that two years is excessive. 
As a purely political matter, the combination of the 
diminished need for immediate relief and the comity problem 
might persuade five members of the Court to draw back from 
a compelling interest test in this case. Still others might 
be drawn on board if you indicate a disposition to rely on 
the immediacy rationale only for statutes of shorter duration. 
An analytical difficulty arises from the immediacy 
requirement. This analysis suggests that the diminished need 
for irranediacy serves to justify the application of the less 
stringent standard of review. When the delay becomes 
excessive, that justification falls away, however. Logically, 
one would be compelled to question whether the less stringent 
standard would continue to apply. I suspect that it probably 
should, and that there may be some way to fudge this problem. 
, At present, I have no answer to this problem, however. 
14. 
Iowa's Different Treatment When the Respondent is a Resident: 
The previous equal protection analysis would appear to 
apply generally to all cases of this kind. The Iowa statute 
has an additional problem, however. It treats divorce 
petitioners differently when the respondent is an Iowa resident. 
The Iowa durational residency requirement does not apply 
"where the respondent is a resident of the state and is served 
by personal service." Iowa Code Ann. § 598.6. The reason for 
this distinction is not apparent, and the State offers no 
justification. 
I suspect that this distinction rests on an assumption 
that it does not offer a significant loophole for "sham 
divorces." My most recent information suggests that Iowa's 
requirement is not a corrnnon one. Professor Wadlington pointed 
me to a couple of books that might be helpful on this score, and 
I hope to have more to report before argument time. 
D.B. 
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MEMO FOR CONFERENCE 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Mootness in Sosna v. Iowa 
This memo will attempt to flesh out the discussion we had 
regarding the possibility that the appeal in Sosna v. Iowa is 
moot in light of the d±vorce of the class representative 
Sosna. You will see from this discussion that the line that 
distin uishes Sosna from recep.t prior decisions is a thin one, - .. - . but one that nonetheless arguably can be drawn. 
An argument against mootness in this case must start 
from the proposition that the relatively brief span of the 
challenged durational residency requirement made this case one 
that would be"capable of repetiti~ ye1:_evading review." As 
such, it would con~titute a recognized exception to the 
{ 
mootness doctrine. This was mentioned. by the lower court in 
in its rµlii.ng ,. See Sosna v. State of Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182, 
1183, n.5 (N.D. Iowa 1973). Moreover, the court's footnote 
indicated that the class representative's residency requirement 
would be satisfied in August of 1973. Since this Court did not 
note probable jurisdiction on the appeal until February of 1974, 
it would appear that the Court must have been prepared on this 
rationale as an initial basis for review. 
When applied to durational requirements, the "capable 
of repetition yet evading review" rationale permits the 
class representative to stand for the class even though that 
-2-
representative had satisfied the durational requirement prior 
to termination of the litigation. This hedge on the mootness 
doctrine simply recognizes that in cases in which the challenged 
durational requirement will be satisfied prior to the time that 
appellate relief could be thought to be forthcoming it is 
preferable to allow one person who had been burdened by the 
challenged restriction to continue to represent the class rathe~ 
than require that the class be represented by a number of 
named plaintiffs who, by virtue of the time at which their 
grievance arose, continue to present an actual and live controversy. 
It thus seems apparent that the Court took this case 
Ion the ass~ ption least be eligible 
-----
that class representative Sosna would at -
to obtain an,-' Iowa divorce prior to 
\ termination of ~his _litigation. Indeed, the lower court's 
l opinion indicates that class representative Sosna was eligible ,n 
~ to~ af~ ..!_his div?rc~ ~~ng bzfore this Court even noted probable ,; 
jurisdiction over the appeal. Viewed in this light, the \ 
~ )~ question becomes whether it matters that the class representa-
J.n'~ tive took advantage of this opportunity. 
~ It seems to me that the fact of Sosna's divorce simply 
serves to highlight the somewhat fictional nature of the 
"capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the 
mootness doctrine. I do not say that critically; I think that 
that exception is a sensible and necessary one. But since 
the Court must have assumed that the class representative could 
• 
1. It appears that Sosna was able to obtain a divorce in 
New York from the first moment of her arrival in Iowa. The fact 
that her divorce was a New York one rather than an Iowa divorce 
does not seem to color this analysis. 
-3-
have obtained an Iowa divorce prior to its acceptance, much 
less disposition, of the appeal, the fact that she actuaily 
did obtain a divorce should be of little consequence. 
Nor should the fact that she obtained a New York divorce 
alter the analysis. That option appeared to be a live one 
from the moment of her arrival in Iowa. The existence of 
that alternative is more relevant to the nature of the burden 
imposed by the Iowa durational requirement than to the mootness 
problem. 
Squaring this analysis with the case law will require ., ... 
reating challenges to duratio~]:__ restrictions differently 
from many other challenges. That appears to be the only way 
to reconcile the highly flexible and liberal approach advocated 
in this case with the Court's previous treatment of mootness 
questio~s • . Thus, the decisions of last term, O'Shea v. Littleton, 
Spomer v. Littleton, and DeFunis v. Odegaard (which was not 
even a class action), are not of much relevance to this 
determination. Indiana Employment Division v, Burney, 409 U.S. 545 
can be distinguished, albeit with somewhat more difficulty. 
It appears that this case falls between Burney, in which 
the class action was mooted by the class representative's receipt 
of relief, and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), in which 
the passage of the residency time period for eligibility to 
vote,did not. The only thing that distinguishes this case from 
Dunn is that whereas in Dunn the class representative was -eligible to vote at the time the challenge reached the Qourt .bJl.t - -----------------
had not (because there was no election in which to vote) in 
-4-
in Sosna the class repPesentative was both eligible to receive 
a divorce and had done so. The Court treated the mootness 
point in a footnote in Dunn, stating 
At the time the opinion below was filed, the next 
election was to be held in November 1970, at which time 
Blumstein would have met the three-month part of 
Tennessee's durational residency requirements. 
The District Court properly rejected the State's 
position that the alleged. inval:id;uty of the three-
month requirement had been rendered moot, and the 
State does not pursue any mootness argument here. 
A 1 though appe llee can now vote, the problem to ... l.! .. ' 
voters posed by the Tennessee residence requirements 
is "capable of repetition yet evading review." 
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Southern 
Pacific Terminal Co. ,v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). 
In this case, unlike Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969), 
the laws in question remain on the books • and 
Blumstein has standing to challenge them as a member 
of the class of people affected by the presently written 
statute. 
4 05 U . S . at 3 3 3 , n . 2 . 
The challenge in Burney was not directed toward a 
durational requirement. Instead, Burney presented a question of 
the propriety of the Indiana system of determining eligibility , 
to receive unemployment compensation benefits. The challenged 
Indiana pracc ice authorized the State to discontinue benefits t 
1, 
-5-
without a prior hearing. The class representative, Mrs. Burney, 
had lost her benefits in this manner, but she had won full 
retroactive payment as a result of a subsequent administrative 
decision. The Court simply noted that Mrs. Burney could 
no longer represent the class. 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennen, dissented, 
asserting that the timing of the administrative procedure 
did not moot the case. He urged that this case was "capable 
of repej:ition yet evading review . " because the post-termination 
review would always occur prior to judicial resolution of the 
controversy. The majority's failure to address that argument 
can be taken as an indication that it felt the analysis 
inapplicable to the facts of the Burney case. 
One final observation on the "capability of repetition" 
in this and other durational residency requirement · 
challenges. That is largely a fiction. The capability of ---------, 
repetition is somewhat remote in all of these cases. In this 
case, Sosna's presence in Iowa has qualified her for abcess 
to the State's divorce forum. Tb.~f'"0nly way that this class 
representative's case could repeat itself would be if she were 
to move from Iowa for a sufficient period to disentitle her to 
the State divorce law, remarry, and again move to the State 
and seek a divorce. Obviously, the liklihood of that occurrence 
is probably somewhat less than the liklihood of Ms. Roe's 
second pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 4f8 U.S. i13 (1972). But is 
is just as re~l a possibility as the biklihood that the class 
-6-
representative in Dunn would find himself subsequently barred 
by the Tennessee residency restriction on voting. He too 
would have had to move out and move back into the area in order 
to have confronted that ear again. Thus in class action 
durational residency challenges "capable of repetition yet 
evading review" simply means that there is no one class representa-
tive who can be expected to continue to be plagued by the 
restriction during the full pendency of litigation and ap~eal. 
The ~ourt simply looks the other way. And, if we are to 
permit class actions in the face of the class representative's 
eligibility for the benefits to which he claims deprivation, 
that representative's enjoyment of this eligibility likewise 











.. ..  .,.,,, 
)· -
No. 73-762 SOSNA L IOWA 
The Chief Just.ice ~ 
. ~~~p~~ 
~ ~ J*_~~ ~ 
Brennan, J. ~ 
Ju, ~ A.I-c~J~) ~ . 
•-n..t) A<.~ ~l-y --1--k-e.L --/_,____. 
c'~ l-'<..,,k~. c~ ~~1 *~~)1-~ 
~~ ~ C.v1.-~~~ 
~°I~~~~­
~ ~ nu_~ .,. 
' f 
Conf. 10/18/74 
Douglas, J. ~ ( ) 




\\'l,i(<·, J . ti~~~ '?c.u.¥-
c1)/-~~;_ lo d.4,c~,.,_,,~ 
() ~/ 
~-~ .th-- Ce/)A..,~--:J.-l_r. 
~ ?~,t.,L/ ---4-1-- ~ -
. c:z_ ~~ ~j; 
' 
l&t~..__~ ~- <Jt-- . 
~LP~~ ~ ~~ 
¥-~ ~ ~~f- ~ 
~ 
l\lar~ldl, .T. l/cU~ ~ ~~~ 




' ··-.. , 
CHAMBERS OF 
~up:rtmt <401ttt itf t4t ~ttitth ~taus 
'J/fhtslyhigtcn.1D. (4. 2I!~JJ~ 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
October 29, 1974 
Re: No. 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa 
Dear Chief: 
Review of my Conference notes makes me uncertain as to 
whether my views in this case can command the support o~ a 
majority of the Court. This is in no way your responsibility, 
since on the issue of "mootness", which is the one that most 
sharply divided the Conference, I "passed". I have now come 
to rest on that point, but thought I would circulate this 
memorandum outlining how I would try to draft the proposed 
per curiam, and see if any responses I get indicate at least 
a willingness to see what is written along these lines with a 
view to ultimately joining it. Certainly if five members of 
the Court disagree outright with any of the positions, I would 
think the opinion should be reassigned. 
Potter led the discussion in the case, and observed that 
there were three issues, and I took it from the ensuing dis-
cussion that almost all of us agreed with him on this point. 
These issues, and the way I would propose to dispose of them, 
are: 
(1) Younger: Since this doctrine is based 
on comity, and exists for the benefit of the 
states, the fact that the state has here 
expressly declined to assert it should remove 
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(2) "Mootness". This has given me a lot 
of trouble, and led me to the conclusion that 
not everything we have said in recent cases 
such as Burney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973); Dunn, 
405 U.S. 330; Moore,394 U.S. 814; Rosario, 
410 U.S. 752; and Richardson v. Ramirez, O.T. 
1973, can be reconciled. Potter in his 
discussion referred to the case of Vaughan 
v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (1970), affirmed 
summarily here, for the proposition that 
a plaintiff who had obtained a divorce could 
continue to represent a class which had not 
obtained a divorce and was challenging a 
durational residency requirement. The test 
of Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, cited in 
Burney, would thus be applied at the time of 
the District Court's determination that the 
action was a proper class action. On th~ 
record in this case, with a stipulation by the 
state that there exists a class of persons 
whom the plaintiff represented at the time 
of the determination that a class action was 
proper, I would find the case was not moot, 
although I would feel differently if there 
had not been a determination in favor of a 
class action by the District Court. 
(3) On the merits, which I show all of us 
except Bill Brennan, Byron, and Thurgood 
reaching, I 'wOUld uphold the validity of the 
state law for the reasons stated by Potter. 
I think the most intricate issue is the one of "mootness", 





requirement of case or controversy that avoids a yo-yo effect --
whereby we bring a case here thinking we will get a substantive 
issue, hear that issue argued, but find ourselves unable to 
decide the issue because of changes in the circumstances of 
the named class action plaintiff-~ ought to be found. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
',f 
October 30, 1974 
Re: No. 73-762, Sosnav. Iowa 
Dear Bill, 
I am in tentative agreement with your conclusions 
on two of the three issues discussed in your letter to the 
Chief Justice of October 29. I differ only as to the Younger 
issue. Specifically, it seems to me that, quite apart from 
the fact that the state divorce action was a civil suit in which 
the State itself was not a party, there is no conceivable . 
Younger issue here because there was no state litigation 
of any kind pending at the time Mrs. Sosna brought her fed-
eral suit. (See Bodie v. Connecticut) 
I am confident, however, that despite our possible 
differences on the Younger issue, you will be able in an 
opinion to deal with it in a way that will cause me no real 
trouble. Something along the following lines would satisfy 
me: 
I 
It has been suggested that the appellant's federal 
suit was barred by the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 
even though the state suit was not a criminal prose-
cution and even though it had terminated before the 
commencement of the federal litigation. This is a 
question we need not pursue, however, because the 

















In short, I anticipate no difficulty in joining an opinion 
along the general lines outlined in your letter to the Chief 
Justice. Because of the rather complete discussion that will 
be required by the mootness issue as well as by the merits, 
I think this should be a signed opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa 
Dear Bill: 
October 30, 1974 
I am in general agreement with your proposed 
approach to a per curiam disposition in this case . 
l
. /Regards, .~ 
'-, ' ' J i1/ i) ~} -, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
'· 
CHAMBERS OF' 
~ttp-Um.t Q}cttrl ltf t4.t ~b ~taftg 
-MJrittgton. ~. Q}. 2.ll.;i'!, 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
October 31, 1974 
Re: No. 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa 
Dear Bill: 
At this early point I think I could go along 
with your approach to an opinion in this case. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 





No. 73-762 Sosna v. Iowa 
Dear Bill: 
I am generally in accord with your outline of an 
opinion 1n the above case. · , 
On the Younger issue, I like Potter's suggested 
paragraph. ,,.,. 
I also agree with Potter that, in view of the ., 
importance of the mootness issue, this should be a signed 
opinion. 
' Sincerely, ' \, 
Mr. Justice ~Rehnquist 
lfp/ss •·i."1'" 
cc: The Conference 
......... 
·:: ., ' 
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~nprmtt QJourt ttf flrt ~h ~taft.s-
'Jllf ~frittgton. ~- <q. 2!lffe'l-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS October 31, 1974 
Dear Bill: 
As to Sosna v. Iowa, 73-762: 
First, I do not see any Younger 
problem in this case. But I could join 
Potter's proposed treat~nt of it. 
Second, I agree with you on 
1000tness. 
Third, I agree with you on 
the merits. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
I 
• I I 
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Ju:prttttt <!Jourl !tf tJrt 'Jlfuitt~ Jtitltg 
Jht,s-lfhtgfott. ,. <q. 2llffe}l,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS November 21, 1974 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion 




Mr. Justice Rehnquist 

















.:§u:p-rtutt QJouri of tlft~h .:§bttt5 
JJa,gfyingLm. ~- <q. 2llffe~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
November 22, 1974 
Re: No. 73-762, Sosna v. Iowa 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in 
this case. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 
(~ -




.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.prtmt QJltttrl of tlrt ~th .itatts 
jirufyhtgton:. ~. QJ. 2ll~~, 
November 25, 1974 
Re: 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa 
Dear Lewis: 
I took a look at Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the 
Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), which you called my 
attention to in connection with footnote 2 in the present 
draft of the opinion in Sosna. I agree with you that the 
question needs more extended treatment than it is presently 
given in footnote 2. 
As I read Ford, Indiana had not raised the issue of 
sovereign immunity in the trial court, but did raise it on 
appeal to this Courtr to that extent the case was like Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), where the State of Illinois 
had not asserted sovereign immunity in the District Court, but 
had asserted it in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, and 
we said that was permissible. 415 U.S., at 677-78. 
We could, of course, go still further and say that even 
though a state Attorney General were to waive the defense in 
the District Court, and adhere to his waiver in this Court, 
we would nonetheless be bound to examine state law on our own 
initiative to see we er t e law of his state permitted him to 
make such a waiver. When I drafted Edelman, I deliberately 
J ~ ~ qL c'~ 4 ~~o-t-
~. 3 -2.-~t~~h o-t--"t:,,; ,L;.__. 
3/ ~ LL<,. ~ ~ 
~. ~~ "'--' r-u-<-<-,,,d.__ ~ . ....,. C,e,u~/ 
i1../--J_~ ..12--,C L1-/ 1 b~~ - Lv-/...__f ldlo_,,-h.~~e_ 





Insert to fn 2 - Sosna? 
While the failure of the State to raise the defense of 
sovereign immunity in the District Court would not have 
barred Iowa from raising that issue in this Court, Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department 
of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), no such defense 
has been advanced in this Court. The failure of Iowa to raise 
the issue has likewise left us without any guidance from the 
parties' briefs as to the circumstances under which Iowa law 
permits waiver of the defense of sovereign immunity by 
attorneys representing the State. Our own examination of Iowa 
precedents disclose~ however, that the Iowa Supreme Court 
has held that the State consents to suit and waives any defense 
of sovereign immunity by entering a voluntary appearance and 
defending a suit on the merits. McKeown v. Brown, 167 Iowa 
489, 499, 149 N.W. 593, 597 (1914). The law of Iowa on the 
point therefore appears to be different from the law of Indiana 




Suggested ~vision of footnote 
11. p. 8 
11. There may be cases in which the controversy 
involving the named plaintiffs is such that it becomes 
moot as to them before the District Court can reasonably 
be expected to rule on a certification motion. In such 
an instance whether the certification can be said to , 
"relate back" to the filing of the complaint may depend 
upon the circumstances of the particular case and 
especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the 
issue would evade review. 
•. 
CHAMBERS OF 
;§np-rtmt <!tttmf: 1tf tqt ~ttitt~ ~g 
jhudp:ttgtMt, ~. cq. 2.Llffe'!.;l 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Decembe.r 4, 1974 
Re: No. 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
.invr-tmt <!lourt of tlf t ~tb ,ifattg 
~as4i:ttghm. J. <q. 2llffe~;l 
CHAMBE:RS OF' 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
December 5, 1974 
Re: No. 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa 
Dear Bill: 
I am working on this case and ask that 
it go over for another week. 
Sincerely, . 
l ~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to Conference 





No. 1 -762 Sosna v. Iowa 
Ride lFttt<~, p. 3 
Due to the nature of appellant Sosna's claim, the 
time required for its final judicial resolution inevitably 
would moot her personal grievance. It thus was apparent 
from the outset of this litiga.tion that the only way to 
obtain judicial review of appellant's claim and of the 
claims of the class that she or any other class plaintiff 
could represent was by reliance on the more generous view 
of jurisdiction that is accorded the narrow class of cases 
that w6uld certainly "evade review' ' if governed by traditional 
concepts of case or controversy. This view stems from the 
practical demands of time. Ahsent this relaxation of the 
traditional doctrine of mootness, a significant class of 
federal claims would remain unredressed for want of a 
spokesman who could retain a personal adversary position 
throughout the course of litigation. Thus, when considering 
whether these cases present the degree of concreteness 
and adversity required by Article III, the Court has 
looked to the likelihood that a named plaintiff would 
again be confronted with an identical controversy or, in 
some cases, to the reasonable certainty of a genuine 
and continuing controversy with unnamed members of the 
class. The same exigency that justifies this limited 
exception identifies its limits. In cases in which the 
alleged harm would not inevitably dissipate during the 
normal time required for resolution of the controversy 
2. 
the general principles of Article 111 jurisdiction 
require that the plaintiff's personal stak e in the litiga-
tion continue throughout the entirety of the litigation.* 
*The role of counsel as the advocate for the 
concrete interests of his client is basic to our adversary 
system. There is no justification, absent the inexorable 
time constraints and the certainty of injury to other class 
members mentioned above, for counsel to appear before a 
federal court representing no identifiable client with a 
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December 9, 1974 
No. 73-762 Sosna v. Iowa. 
Dear Bill: 
As 7.ou know from our casual conversations, I have been 
"hung up' on your circulation in the above case because it 
seems to open the door to class action litigation in which 
no identifiable parties have the slightest interest. 
Perhaps it is indicative of my ancient age at the bar, 
but I am still repelled by the spectacle of a lawyer arguing 
a case in our Court when we all know that there is no 
identifiable party in interest who even knows that the case 
is being heard; no client with whom the lawyer can confer, 
or who can give the lawyer instructions whether to continue 
the litigation; and no one, other than the lawyer or some 
self-appointed organization with a generalized interest, to 
pay court costs, printing costs and legal fees. We have 
seen recent examples of this in Ellis, Sosna and other cases. 
When I was in law school this perlormance would be characterized 
as champerty and maintenance. 
· I recognize, of course, that there are genuine cases 
"capable of repetition, but evading review". This is a 
reality which is now recognized, and perhaps is necessary 
to assure federal vindication of certain claims. In any event, 
I accept this inroad into ancient concepts of "case and 
controversy". But I do wish not to expand the exception, 
and it seems to me that Sosna - as presently drafted - can 
be construed to be more open ended than previous class action 
decisions<!.·&· Burney) have been. 
., ... ·C-J'I<..-·--· "' ...... ,,., .• ,.j\ ... , 
- 2 -
With these thoughts in mind, I have taken the liberty 
of drafting a rider or two and making certain other con-
forming changes in Part I of your Sosna draft. These are 
mere suggestions enclosed for your consideration. If you 
accept them in principle, I have no doubt that you can 
reframe them more effectively. 
I call your attention to my substitute for your foot-
note No. 11. I am writing Gerat:ein. It clearly would be 
moot but for the "evading review" exception. Moreover, the 
record in Gerstein does not clearly indicate that the case 
would be controlled by the Sosna rationale of viewing the 
certification of the class as the controlling date for 
determining mootness. I therefore have suggested an 
alteration to your opinion that would facilitate the moot-
ness discussion in mine. 
Additionally, I have suggested that you delete the 
first sentence to footnote No. 12. I read your present 
footnote to suggest that the problem in Burney was the 
possibility of the absence of a class that retained an 
interest in the litigation. In my view, that tends urmeces-
sarily to equate Burney with the line of cases in which the 
Court cannot reasonably demand that the suit be brought by 
a plaintiff who retains a personal interest in the controversy 
throughout its entirety. 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~ttprtmt (!fllttri of tlft ~th ~bdts 
jlas!pttg~ ~. (!f. 2llffe'1' 
December 10, 1974 
Re: No. 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa 
Dear Lewis: 
I fully agree with the thrust of the changes that you 
have suggested in Sosna, and think the attached revised 
draft will satisfy you. I have distributed your suggested 
language in a couple of different places, but virtually all 
of it is still there. 
Sincerely, . 
~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
,· 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr· Justice Doug·las 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Juwtice White 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
/ Mr· Justice Powell 
- Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
2nd DRAF1l.1 
SUPB ME C 
From: 1iarshall, J. 
E OURT OF THE UNITED STtt.!1a ted: 
No. 73-762 
Carol Maureen Sosna, etc.,) On Appeal from the United 
Appellant, States District Court for 
v. . the Northern District of 
State of Iowa et al. Iowa. 
[December -, 1974] 
MR. JUS'.l'ICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The Court today departs sharply from the course we 
have followed in analyzing durational residency require-
ments since Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). 
Because I think the principles set out in that case and 
its progeny compel reversal here, I respectfully dissent. 
As we have made clear in Shapiro and subsequent 
cases, any classification that penalizes exercise of the 
constitutional right to travel is invalid unless it is justi-
fied by a compelling governmental interest. As recently 
as last Term we held that the right to travel requires that 
States provide the same vital governmental benefits and 
privileges to recent immigrants that they do to long-
time residents. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 
415 U.S. 250, 261 (1974). Although we recognized that 
not all durational residency requirements are penalties 
upon the exercise of the right to travel interstate,1 we 
held that free medical aid, like voting, see Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), and welfare assistance, see 
Shapiro v. Thom'f)Son, supra, was of such fundamental 
importance that the State could not COI}stitutionally con-
dition its receipt upon long-term residence. After 
examining Arizona's justifications for restricting the 
1 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, supra, 415 U. S., at 












2' SOSNA v. IOWA 
availability of free medical services, we concluded that, 
the State had failed to show that in pursuing legitimate 
objectives it had chosen means that did not impinge 
unnecessarily upon constitutionally protected interests. 
The Court's failure to address the instant case in these 
terms suggests a new distaste for the mode of analysis 
we have applied to this corner of equal protection law. 
In its stead, the Court has employed what appears to be 
an ad hoc balancing test, under which the State's puta-
tive interest in ensuring that its divorce plaintiffs estab-
lish some roots in Iowa is said to justify the one-year 
residency requirement. I am concerned not only about 
the disposition of this case, but also about the implica-
tions of the majority's analysis for other divorce statutes 
and for durational residency requirement cases in general. 
I 
The Court omits altogether what should be the first 
inquiry: whether the right to obtain a divorce is of suffi-
ci'ent importance that its denial to recent immigrants 
constitutes a penalty on interstate travel. In my view, 
it clearly meets that standard. The previous decisions· 
of this Court make it plain that the right of marital 
association is one of the most basic rights conferred on 
the individual by the State. The interests associated 
with marriage and qivorce have repeat~dly been accorded 
particular deference, and the right to marry has been 
termed "one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). In Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), we recognized that the right 
to seek dissolution of the marital relationship was closely· 
related to the right to marry, as both involve the volun-
tary adjustment of the same fundamental human rela-
tionship. Id., at 383. Without further laboring the 
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seek dissolution of the marital relationship is of such 
fundamental importance that denial of this right to the 
class of recent interstate travelers penalizes interstate 
travel within t,he meaning of Shapiro, Dunn, and Mari-
copa County. 
II 
Having determined that the interest in obtaining a 
divorce is of substantial social importance, I would 
scrutinize Iowa's durational residency requirement to 
determine whether it constitutes a reasonable means of 
furthering important interests asserted by the State. 
The Court, however, has not only declined to apply the 
"compelling interest" test to this case, it has conjured up 
possible justifications for the State's restriction in a 
manner much more akin to the lenient standard we have 
in the past applied in analyzing equal protection chal-
lenges to business regulations. See McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U. S. 420, 425-428 (1961); Kotch v. Baard of 
River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U. S. 552, 557 ( 1947); but 
see Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U. S. 361, 376 (1974). I 
continue to be of the view that the 1'rational basis" test 
has no place in equal protection analysis when important 
individual interests with constitutional implications are at 
stake, see San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S.1, 109 (1973) (MARSHALL, J .. dissenting); Dandridge 
v. Williarns, 397 U.S. 471, 520-522 (1970) (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting) . But whatever the ultimate resting point of 
the current readjustments in equal protection analysis, 
the Court has clearly directed that the proper standard 
to apply to cases in which state statutes have penalized 
the exercise of the right to interstate travel is the "com-
pelling interest" test. Shapiro, supra, 394 U. S., at 634, 
638; Oregon v. Mitchell , 400 U. S. 112,238 (1970) (opin-
ion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.); Dunn~ 
supra, 405 U. S., at 342-343 ; Memorial Hospital, supra,, 
4.15 U. S., at 262--2:63. 
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73- 762-DISSENT 
SOSNA v. IOWA 
The Court proposes three defenses for the Iowa 
statute: first, the residency requirement merely delays 
receipt of the benefit in question-it does not deprive the 
applicant of the benefit aJtogether; second, since signifi-
cant social consequences may follow from the conferral 
of a divorce, the State ma,y legitimately regulate the 
divorce process; and third, the State has interests both 
in protecting itself from use as a "divorce mill" and in 
protecting its judgments from possible collateral attack 
in other States. In my view, the first two defenses pro-
vide no significant support for the statute in question 
here. Only the third has any real force. 
A 
With the first justification, the Court seeks to distin-
guish the Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County cases. 
Yet the distinction the Court draws seems to me specious. 
Iowa's residency requirement, the Court says, merely 
forestalls access to the courts; applicants seeking welfare 
payments, medical aid, and the right to vote, on the other 
hand, suffer unrecoverable losses throughout the waiting 
period. This analysis, however, ignores the severity of 
the deprivation suffered by the divorce petitioner who is 
forced to wait a year for relief. The injury accompany-
ing that delay is not directly measurable in money terms 
like the loss of welfare benefits, but it cannot reasonably 
be argued that when the year has elapsed, the petitioner 
is made whole. The year's wait prevents remarriage and 
lbcks both partners into what may be an intolerable, 
destructive rela.tionship. Even applying the Court's 
argument on its own terms, I fail to see how the Maricopa 
County case can be distinguished. A potential patient: 
may well need treatment for a single ailment. Under 
Arizona statutes he would have had to wait a year before 
he could be treated. Yet the majority's analysis would 


















SOSNA v. IOWA 5 
aid is not cognizable because he would "eventually qualify 
for the same sort of [service]," antf_3, at 12. The Court 
cannot mean that Mrs. Sosna has not suffered any injury 
by being foreclosed from seeking a divorce in Iowa for a 
year. It must instead mean that it does not regard that 
deprivation as being very severe.2 
B 
I find the majority's second argument no more persua-
sive. The Court forgoes reliance on the usual justifica-
tions for durational residency requirements-budgetary 
considerations and administrative convenience, see Sha,,. 
piro, 3114 U. S., at 627-638; Maricopa County, 415 U. S., 
at 262-269. Indeed, it would be hard to make a persua-
sive argument that either of these interests is significantly 
implicated in this case. In their place, the majority 
invokes a more amorphous justification-the magnitude 
of the interests affected and resolved by a divorce pro-
ceeding. Certainly the stakes in a divorce are weighty 
both for the individuals directly involved in the adjudi-
cation and for others immediately affected by it. The 
critical importance of the divorce process, howeveri 
weakens the argument for a long residence requirement 
rather than strengthening it. The impact of the divorce 
decree only underscores the necessity that the State's 
regulation be evenhanded.3 
2 The majority also relies on its "mere delay" distinction to dispose-
of Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, see (J!nte, at 15. Yet even though 
the majority in Boddie relied on due process rather than equal pro-. 
tection, I am fully convinced that if the Connecticut statute in 
question in that cast> had required indigents to wait a year for a 
divorce, the statute would still have been constitutionally infirm, 
see 401 U. S., at 383-386 (DOUGLAS, J ., concurring in the result) , 
a point tho Court implicitly rejects today. 
3 The majority identifies marital status, property rights, and 
custody and support arrangements as the important concerns com-

















It is not enough to recite the State's traditionally 
exclusive responsibility for regulating family law matters; 
some tangible interference with the State's regulatory 
scheme must be shown. Yet in this case, I fail to see 
how any legitimate objective of Iowa's divorce regula-
tions would be frustrated by granting equal access to new 
state residents.4 To 'draw on an analogy, the States, 
have great interests in the local voting process and 
wide latitude in regulating that process. Yet one regu-
lation that the States may not impose is an unduly long 
residence requirement. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 
330 (1972). To remark, as the Court does, that because 
of the consequences riding 011 a clivor,ce decree "Iowa may 
insist that one seeking to initiate such a proceeding have 
the modicum of attachment to the state required here" 
is not to make an argument, but merely to state the 
result. 
C 
The Court's third justification seems to me the only 
one that warrants close consideration. Iowa has a legiti-
mate interest in protecting itself against invasion by 
those seeking quick divorces in a forum with relatively 
lax divorce laws, and it may have some interest in avoid-
ing collateral attacks on its decree in other States.° 
divorce jurisdiction over its new citizens, Iowa does not avoid affect-
ing these weighty social concerns; instead, it freezes them in an 
unsatisfactory state that it would not require its long-time residents 
to endure. 
4 A durational requirement such as Iowa's 90-day conciliation 
]Jeriod would not, of com~e, be ~ubject to an equal protection 
challenge, as it is required uniformly of all divorce petitioners. 
5 Iowa does not rely on these factors to support its statute. In 
its brief the State merely argues that the legislature's determination 
to impose a one-year residency requirement was reasonable "in light 
of the interest of the State of Iowa in a di8solution proceeding." 
~Appellee's Brief, at 8). The 'Full Faith and Credit a,rgument L-t 
·. 
73--762-biSSFN'l' 
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These interests, however, would adequately be protected 
by a simple requirement of domicile~physical presence 
plus intent to remain--which would remove the rigid 
one-year barrier while permitting the State to restrict 
the availability of its divorce process to citizens who are 
genuinely its own.6 
The majority notes that in Williams v. North Carolina, 
325 U. S. 226 ( 1945), the Court held that for ex parte 
divorces one State's finding of domicile could, under 
limited circumstances, be challenged in the courts of 
another. From this, the majority concludes that since 
Iowa's findings of domicile might be subject to collateral 
attack elsewhere, it should be permitted to cushion its 
findings with one-year residency requirement. 
For several reasons, the year's waiting period seems to 
me neither necessary nor much of a cushion. First, the 
Williams opinion was not aimed at States seeking to avoid 
becoming divorce mills. Quite the opposite, it was 
rather plainly directed at States that had cultivated a 
"quickie divorce" reputation by playing fast and loose 
mentioned only in the middle of a long quotation from another 
court's opinion (id., at 9). This is hardly sufficient to meet the 
requirement of a "clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary 
to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest." 
Oregon v. Mitchell, snpra, 400 U.S., at 238 ; Sherbert v. Vernei-, 374 
U.S. 398,406-409 (1963). 
6 The availability of a less restrictive alternative such as a domicifo 
requirement weighs heavily in testing a challenged state regulation 
against the "compelling interest" standard. See Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U. S., at 638; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 342, 350-
352; Memorial Hospital v Maricopa County, 415 U S., at 267; 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960) . Since the Iowa courts 
have in effect interpreted the residence statute to require proof of 
domicile as well as one year\ residence, see Kors.rud v. Koi-srud, 242 
Iowa 178, 45 N. W. 2d 848 (1951); Julson v. Julson, 255 Iowa 301, 
122 N W. 2d 329 (1963), a shift to a '(pure" domicile test would 
impose no new burden on the State's fact-finding process. 
-. 
J:\ .. , , 
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with findings of domicile. See 32,5 U. S., at 236-237, 241 
(Murphy, J., concurring). If Iowa wishes to avoid 
becoming a haven for divorce seekers, it is inconceivable 
that its good-faith determinations of domicile would not 
meet the rather lenient full faith and credit standards 
set out in Williams. 
A second problem with the majority's argument on 
this score is that Williams applies only to ex piarte 
divorces. This Court has held that if both spouses were 
before the divorcing court, a foreign State cannot recog-
nize a collateral challenge that would not be permissible 
in the divorcing State. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 
(1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948); Johnson v. 
Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951); Cook v. Cook, 342 
U. S. 126 (1951). Therefore, the Iowa statute sweeps 
too broadly, even as a defense to possible collateral 
attacks, since it imposes a one-year requirement when-
ever the respondent does not reside in the State, regard-
less of whether the proceeding is ex parte.7 
Third, even a one-year period does not provide com-
plete protection against collateral attack. It merely 
makes it somewhat less likely that a second State will be 
able to find "cogent evidence" that Iowa's determination 
of domicile was incorrect. But if the Iowa court has 
erroneously determined the question of domicile, the 
year's residence will do nothing to preclude collateral 
attack under Williams. 
Finally, in one sense the year's residency requirement 
may technically increase rather than reduce the exposure 
of Iowa's decress to collateral attack. Iowa appears to, 
be among the States which have interpreted their divorce· 
7 This problem could be cured in largP part if the State ~aivect \ 
it:, year's residence requirement whenever the resvondrnt agreed to, 
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resideucy requirements as being of jurisdictional import 8 
Since a State's divorce decree is subject to collateral 
challenge in a foreign forum for any jurisdictional flaw 
that would void it in the State's own courts, New Yark 
ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610 (1947), the resi-
dency requirement exposes Iowa divorce proceedings to 
attack both for failure to prove domicile and for failure 
tb prove one year's residence. If nothing else, this casts 
doubt on the majority's speculation that Iowa's residency 
requirement may have been intended as a statutory shield 
for its divorce decrees. In sum, concerns about the need 
for a long residency requirement to defray collateral 
attacks on state judgments seem more fanciful than real. 
If, as the majority assumes, Iowa is interested in assuring 
itself that its divorce petitioners are legitimately Iowa 
citizens, requiring petitioners to provide convincing evi-
dence of bona fide domicile should be more than adequate 
to the task.9 
8 See Hinds v. Hinds, 1 Iowa 36 (1955); H'illiamson v. Williamson, 
179 Iowa 489, 161 N. W. 482, 485 (1917), Miller v. Miller, 242 Iowa 
178, 45 N. W. 2d 848 (1951); Schaefer v. Schaefer, 245 Iowa 1343, 
66 N. W. 2d 428, 433 (1954), cf. White v. White, 138 Conn. 1, 81 
A. 2d 450 (1951); Wyman v. Wyman, 212 N. W. 2d 368 (Minn. 
1973); Camp v Camp, 21 Misc. 2d 908, 189 N. Y. S. 2d 561 (1959) 
(cor.struing Florida law). While the Williams case establishes that 
collateral attack ran always he mounted agaim;t the divorcing State',; 
fin<ling of domicile, other States have provided that failure to meet 
the durational residency requirement is not jurisdictional :md thus 
does not provide an independent basis for collateral attack, see, e. g., 
Schl'l?iner v Schreiner, 502 S. W. 2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); 
Hammond v. Hammond, 45 Wash. 2d 855, 278 P 2d 387 (1954) 
(construing Idaho law) 
0 The majority argues that ~ince most StatP~ require a year's 
residence for divorce, Iowa gains refuge from the risk of collateral 
attack in the understanding solicitude of States with similar laws. 
Of course, absent unusual circumstances, a judgmC'nt by this Court 
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III 
I conclude that the course Iowa has chosen in restrict-
ing access to its divorce courts unduly interferes with the 
right to "migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a 
new life." Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U. S., at 
629. I would reverse the judgment of the District Court 
and remand for entry of an order granting relief if the 
court finds that there is a continuing controversy between 
the parties. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 
(1974); Johnson v. New York State Education Dept., 
409 U. S. 75, 79 n. 7 (1972) (MARSHALL, J., concurring). 
states with one- and two-year residency requirements. For the 
same reason, the risk of subjecting Iowa to an invasion of divorce-
seekers seems minimal. If long re~idency requirements are held' 
unconstitutional, Iowa will not stand ronspicuously alone without a 
residency requiremrnt "defense." Moreover, its 90-day conciliation 
period, required of all divorce petitioners in the State, would still 
serve to discourage peripatetic divorce-sceker.s who are looking for 
the quickest possible adiudicatian.. 
~np-rttttt arlllttl of f!rt ~th ~tat.ts 
-a$fringbttt, ,. or. 2.0'ffe'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
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MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
It is axiomatic that Art. III of the Constitution im-
poses a "threshold requirement ... that those who seek 
to invoke the power of federal cqurts must allege aq 
actual case or controversy." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 
U. S. 488, 493 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 94-
101 (1968); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 421-
425 ( 1969 ( opinion of MARSHALL, J.). To satisfy the 
requirement, plaintiffs must allege "sqme threatened or 
actual injury," Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 
617 (l973), that is "real aµd immediate" and not con-
jectural or hypothetical. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 
103, 108-109 (1969); Maryland Casuqlty Co. v. Pacific 
Co., 312 U.S. 270,273 (19'1,l); United Public Workers v. 
Mitchf,ll, 330 U. S. 75, 89-91 (1947). ·Furthermore, and 
of greatest releva11ce here, 
"The· fundamental aspect of standing is that it 
focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint 
before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes 
to have adjudicated. The 'gist of the question of 
standing' 1s whether the party seeking relief has 
'a]leged such a personal stake in the outcome of the-
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness 
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon 
which th~ cQur.t SQ largely depends for illuminatiorr. 
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of difficult constitutional questions.' Bake.r v. Carr, 
369 l1. S 186, 204 ( H)62). In other words, when 
stauchng is placed in issue in a case, the question is 
whether the persou whose standing is challenged is 
a proper party to request an adjudication of a par-
ticular issue and not whether the issue itself is justi-
ciable." Flast v Cohen, supra, at 99-100 (footnote 
omitt1,d), 
All of this the Court concedes. It is conceded as well 
that had the named plaintiffs 111 this case not brought a 
class action, the case would now be dismissed as moot 
because the plaintiff, appellant here, has now satisfied 
the Iowa residence requirement aud, what is more, has 
secured a divorce in another State. Appellant could not 
have begun this suit either for herself or for a class if at 
the time of filing she had been an Iowa resident for a 
year or had secured a divorce in another jurisdiction. 
There must be a named plaintiff initiating the action 
who has ati existing controversy with the defendant,. 
whether the plaintiff is suing on his own behalf or on 
behalf of a class as well. However unquestioned it may 
be that a class of persons in the community has a "real" 
-dispute of substance with the defendant, an attorney 
may not initiate a class action without having a client 
with a personal stake in the c011troversy, who is a mem-
ber of the class, and who is willing to be the named plain-
tiff in the case. The Court recently made this very clear 
when it said that "if none of the named plaintiffs pur-
porting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a 
case or controversy with the defendants, non may seek 
relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the 
class.'' O'Shea v. Littleton, sitpra, at 494. 
The Court nevertheless holds that once a case is certi-
fied as a class action, the named plaintiff may lose that 
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be acceptable as a party to prosecute the suit to con-
clusion on behalf of the class. I am unable to agree. 
The appellant now satisfies the Iowa residence require-
ment and has secured a divorce. She retains no real 
interest whatsoever m this controversy, certainly not an 
interest that would have entitled her to be a plaintiff in 
the first place, either alone or as representing a class. 
In reality, there is no longer a named plaintiff in the 
case, no member of the class before the Court. The 
unresolved issue, the attorney, and a class of unnamed 
litigants remain. But no one in the class with a personal 
stake in the controversy is before the Court. None of 
the anonymous members of the class is present to direct 
counsel and ensure that class interests are being properly 
served. For all practical purposes, this case has become 
one-sided and has lost the adversary quality necessary 
to satisfy the constitutional "case or controversy" require-
ment. A real issue unquestionbly remains, but the 
necessary adverse party to press it has disappeared. 
The Court thus dilutes the jurisdictional command of 
Art. III to a mere prudential guideline.1 The only spe-
cific, identifiable individual with an evident continuing 
interest in presenting an attack upon the residency 
requirement is appellant's counsel. The Court in reality 
holds that an attorney's competence in presenting his 
case, 1waluated post hoc through a review of his per-
formance as revealed by the record, fulfills the "case or 
controversy" mandate. The legal fiction employed to 
cloak this reality is the reification of an abstract entity, 
"the class," constituted of faceless, unnamed individuals 
1 The Conrt quite candidly admits that it is relaxing the "tradi-
tional notion of mootne~~" and 1s carving a "linuted exception to 
the traditional doctrme ' Ante, at 7 n. 9, 8. The Court fails 
to explam how 1t can crratr an exception to Art III, the constitu-
tional limitation of it~ own \urmliction 
4 
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who are deemed to have a live case or controversy with 
appellees.2 
No prior decision supports the Court's broad rationale. 
In cases in which the ina~equacy of the named represent-
ative's claim has become apparent prior to class certifi-
fication, the Court has been en~phatic in rejecting tlie 
argument that the class action could still be pursued. 
O'Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 494-495; Bailey v. Patter-
son, 369 U. S. 31, 32-33 (1962). Cf. Richardson v. 
Ramirez, - U. S. - (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 
45, 48-49 (1969). 
It is true that Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333, 
n. 2 (1972), looks in the otper direction. There, by the 
time the Court rendered its decision, the class represent-
ative in an action challenging a durational residence 
requirement for voting had satisfied the requirement and 
was eligible to vote in the next election. The Court 
indic11ted that the case was not moot, saying that the 
issue was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 
But the question was not contested between the parties 
and was noted only in passing. Its ramifications for the 
question of mpotness in a class action setting were not 
explored. Although I joined the opinion in that case, 
I do not deem it dispositive of the jurisdictional issue 
here, especially in light of Indiana Employment Security 
Divisino v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973). There the 
class representative's claim had been fully settled, and 
the Court remanded the case to the District Court for 
consideration of mootness, a course which the majority, 
2 The Court contends that its rationale is the prevailing view in 
the circmts and hsts four circuits in support and two opposing. 
Ante, at 7-8 11. 10. Of the four in support, onr represents dictum 
only. Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1081-1082 (CA3 
1973) . Another consists of an affirmance of a district court decision 
without discussion of mootnPss. Makres v. Askew, - F. 2d --
(CA5 1974). 
,,,, 








_.,· __ . 
73-762-DISSENT (A) 
SOSNA v. IOWA 5 
relying on Dunn, rejects here. As I see it, the question 
of. whether a plass action survives after the renresenta-
tive's claim h~s been m~oted remains unsettled by prior 
decisions. lpdeeq, what authority there is provides more 
support for a conclusion th~t when the persontj,l stake 
of t~e named plaintit{ terminates, the class ll,Ction fails. 
Although the Court cites Dunn v. Blumsteiri,, supra, as . ' 
controlling autpority, the prjncipal basis for its approach 
is a conception of the class · f!Ction that substantially dis-
sipates the case or controversy requirement as well as 
the necessity for adequate representation uncler Rule 23 
(a)( 4), :fed. Rule Civ. Proc. In the Court's view, the 
litigation before us is sa~ed from mootness only by the 
fact that class certification occurred prior to appellant's 
change in circumstance. In justification, the Court 
points to two significant consequences of certification. 
First, once certifieq, the class action may not be settled 
or dismissed withou.t the District Court's approval. 
Secoi1d, if the action results in a judgment on the merits, 
the derision wil1 bind all members found at the time of 
certification to be members of the class. These are sig-
nificant aspects of class-action procedure, but it is not 
evident l!-nd not explained how a.nd why these procedural 
cons1:iquences of cettification modify the normal mootness 
con;siderations which would otherwise attach. Certifica-
' ' tion is no substitute for a live plaintiff with a personar 
intere$t in the case sufficient to make it an adversary 
proceeding. · Moreover, oertific~tion is not irreversible or 
inalterable; it "may be conditional, and may be altered 
or amended before the decision on the merits.,, Rule· 
23 (c)(l) .3 Furthermore, under Rule 23 (d) the Court-
rpay make variou~ types of orders in conducting the liti-
gation, including an order that notice be given "of the· 
8 See 7 A Wnght & Mi'ller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1785, 
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opportunity of members to signify whether they consider 
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and 
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the 
action' ' and "requiring that the pleadings be amended 
to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation 
of absent persons. 4 Class litigation is most often 
characterized by its complexity and concommitant flexi-
bility of a oourt in managing it, and emphasis upon one 
point in the process flies in the face of that reality. 
The new certification procedure of Rule 23 (c) (1) as 
amended in 1966 was not intended to modify the~-~ --
tures of Rule 82 that " [ t]h1:1se rules shall not be construed 
to extend ... the jurisdiction of the United States district 
courts .... " Cf. Sr,,yp,er v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337-338 
( 1969). The intention behind the certification amend-
ment, which had no counterpart in the earlier version of 
the rule, was merely "to give clear definition to the 
action ... ," Advisory Committee Note, 39 F. R. D. 69, 
104; 3B Moore, Federal Practice TT 23.50, at 23-1101-23-
1102 ( 1974), not as the Court would now have it , to 
avoid juristictional problems of mootness.5 
4 See 7A Wright & Miller, s-µpra, §§ 1793, 1794; 3B Moore, supra, 
if123.72, 23.73, 23.74. 
5 The Court apparently also does not view cntification as the key 
to it;, holding since it mentions in dicta that some class actions will 
not be moot even though the named represf'ntatives' claims become 
moot prior to cntification. If the· District Court does not have a 
reasonable amount of time within which to decide the certificat10n 
question prior to the mootmg of the named parties' controversies, 
th<· Court says, "[i]n such ins'tances, whether the certification can 
be said to 'relate back' to the filing of the complaint may depend 
upon the circumstances of the particular case and especially the 
reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review."· 
Ante, at, 8 n. 11. If certification 1s not the factor which saves the 
case from mootnesH, it ;,ppeurs that thf' Court is satisfied that the 
case is a bvr controvers? as long as an issue would otherwise not be 
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It is claimed that the certified class supplies the neces-
sary adverse parties for a continuing case or controversy 
with appellees. This 1s not true, but even if it were, the 
Court is left wf th the problem of determining whether 
the class action is still a good one and whether under 
Rule 23 (a.) ( 4) appellant is a fair and adequate repre-
sentative of the plass. That appellant can no longer in 
any realistic sense be considered a ' member of the class 
makes these determinations imperative. The Court dis-
poses of the problem to its own satisfaction by saying 
that it is unlikely that segments of the class appellant 
represents would have conflicting interests with those she 
has sought to advance and that because the interests of 
the class have been competently urged at each level of 
the proceeding the test of Rule 23 (a)( 4) is met. The 
Court cites no authority for this retrospective decision 
as to the adequacy of representation which seems to focus 
on the competence of counsel rather than a party plain-
tiff who is a representative member of the class.6 At the· 
very least, the case should be remanded to the District 
Court where these considerations could be explored and 
the desirability of issuing orders under Rule 23 ( d) to 
protect the class might be considered. 
The Court's refusal to remand for consideration of 
mootness and adequacy of representation can be ex-
plained only by its apparent notion that there may be 
categories of issues which will permit lower courts to pass 
upon them but which by their very nature will become 
moot before this Court can address them. Thus it is 
standard of mootness applit>s to cast>s appealable to the courts of 
zippt>~ll:l. 
6 Thr gt>neral rule has been that the "[q]uality of representation 
embraces both tbt> competenct~ of the legal counsel of the representa-
tives and the statur" and mterest of the named parties themselves." 
7 Wright & Mill~r , supra, § 1766, at 632-633. The decisions m thr 
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said that "no single challenger will remain subject to [ tp.e 
residency requirement] for the period necessary to see 
such a lawsuit to its conclusion." Ante, at 6. Hence, 
the Court perceives the need for a general rule which 
will elimmate the problem. Article III, however, i.s an 
"awkward" limhation. It prevents all federal courts 
from addressing some important questions; there is noth-
ing surprising iI:]- the fact that it may permit only the 
lower federal courts to address other questions. Article 
I 
III is not a rule always consistent with judicial economy. 
Its overriding purpose is to define the boundaries separat-
ing the branches and to keep this Court from assuming 
a legislative perspective and function. See Flast v. 
Cohen, supra, at 96. The ultimate basis of the Court's 
decision must be p, conclusion that the issue presented 
is an important ~nd recurring one which should be finally 
resolved here. But this notion cannot override consti-
tutional limitations. 
Because l find 'that the case before the Court has 
become moot, I must respect£ ully dissent. 
'• ,, . 
'' 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
RE: Sosna v. Iowa 
Attached are two separate approaches to a revision of 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion. My preference, identified as number 
one, is to initiate Justice Rehnquist's discussion with our 
-------
insert or something along the lines of that insert. This, in 
my opinion, sets tbe tone of what follows in the best 
possible manner. Unfortunately, this approach also requires 
the most significart:revisions of Justice Rehnquist's draft. 
The second approach is to slip the insert or its 
approximation into the text of Justice Rehnquist's opinion at 
about page 5 of his second draft. This requires less deletion 
of Justice Rehnquist's language but does call for some 
reorganization of his draft. The reorganized pages are 
attached. 
'!be final and least intrusive approach is to add ,.... O.f\ 









accompanies note 10. That addition would be shorte;, 
something along the following lines: 
The same rationale that identifies the 
mootness doctrine applied in Dunn also 
identifies its lim1ts. In cases in which the 
alleged harm would not dissipate during the 
time required for resolution of the controversy 
the general principles applicable to the 
definition of our Article III jurisdiction require 
that the plaintiff's personal stake in the 
litigation continue throughout the entirety of 
its course. 
This really doesn't add much by way of changing the thrust 
of the opinion. If this is the alternative you prefer, you 
might consider simply asking Justice Rehnquist to elevate his 
footnote 9 to the text and leave it to him. 
The other changes are constant in all three alternatives. 
First, I have revised the Gerstein footnote (note 11 in his draft) 
in accordance with your version. Additionally, I think that 
the note that deals with Burney (note 12 of the draft) should 
3. 
be deleted entirely. The note conveys a false impression of 
Burney and tends unnecessarily to equate Burney with the class 
of cases that are discussed in the text. If Burney stands for 
anything, its for the proposition that the Court felt that 
the case was not of the kind that would necessarily "evade 
review" if subjected to the normal mootness doctrines. By 
---------------------
characterizing Burney as a problem of in which ' there was 
doubt whether an aggrieved class continues to exist,the 
footnote equates that case with this one more than is 
desirable. 
A final word from the grapevine. Justice White's clerk 
has prepared something on the mootness point. He won't tell 
me what it is but states that Justice White is troubled by 
Justice Rehnquist's draft. You might wish to see what he 




PS-- I think that Justice Marshall's dissent is quite well taken. 
I continue to think that you should consider attempting to 
explain why the com~elling interest test does not apply. I 
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Iowa 1973). We noted probable jurisdiction, 415 U. S. 
911, and directed the parties to discuss "whether the 
United States District Court should have proceeded to 
the merits of the constitutional issue presented in light 
of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) and related 
cases." For reasons stated in this opinion, we de~ide 
that this case is not moot, and hold that the Iowa dura-
tional residency requirement for divorce does not offend 
the United States Constitution.3 
I 
Appellant sought certification of her suit as a class 
action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 so that she 
might represent the "class of those residents of the 
State of Iowa who have resided therein for a period of 
less than one year and who desire to initiate actions for 
dissolution of marriage or legal separation, · and who are 
barred from doing so by the one-year durational resi-
dency requirement embodied in Section 598.6 and 598.9 of 
the Code of Iowa." 4 The parties stipulated that there 
3 Our request that the parties address themselves to You'Tl{Jer v. 
Harris, supra, and related issues, indicated our concern as to whether 
either this Court or the District Court should reach tl;ie merits of the 
constitutional issue presented by the parties in light of appellant 
Sosna's failure to appeal the adverse ruling of the State District 
Court through the state appellate network. In response to our re-
quest, both parties urged that we reach the merits of appellant's 
constitutional attack on Iowa's durational residency requirement. 
In this posture of the case, and in the absence of a disagreement 
between the parties, we have no occasion to address whether any 
consequences adverse to appellant resulted from her first obtaining 
an adjudication of her claim on the merits in the Iowa state court and 
on1y then commencing ti1is action in the United States District Court. 
4 Since jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), this 
case pres.ents no problem of aggregation of claims in an attempt to 
satisfy the requisite amount in controversy of 28 U.S. C. § 1331 (a). 
Cf. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U. S, 291 (1973); Snyder v. 
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were in the State of Iowa "numerous people in the same 
situation as plaintiff," that joinder of those persons was 
impracticable, that appellant's claims were representa-
tive of the class, and that she would fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class. See Rule 23 
(a) . This stipulation was approved by the District 
Court in a pretrial order.5 After the submission of briefs 
and proposed findings of fact and conclusionB of law by 
the parties, the three-judge court by a divided vote up-· 
held the constitutionality of the statute. 
While the · parties may be permitted to waive non-
jurisdictional defects, they may not by stipulation invoke 
the judicial power of the United States in litigation 
which does not present an actual "case or controversy,": 
Richardson v. Ramirez, - U.S. - (1974), apd on the· 
record before us we feel obliged to address the question 
of mootness before reaching the merits of appellant's 
claim. At the time the judgment of the three-judge 
court was handed down, appellant had not yet resided 
in Iowa for one year, and that court was clearly pre-
sented with a case or controversy in every sense con-
templated by Art. III of the Constitution.6 By the time· 
specify, the absence of a claim for monetary relief and the nature of 
the claim asserted discloses that a Rule 23 (b) (2) class action was· 
contemplated. Therefore, the problems associated with a Rule 23 (b) 
(3) class action, which were considered by this Court last Term in 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U, S. 156 (1974), are not present 
in this case. 
~ The defendant state court judge neither raised any claim of im-
munity as a defense to appellant's action, nor questioned the propriety 
of the appellant's effort to represent a statewide class against a de-
fendant such as he who apparently sat in a single county or judicial: 
district within the State. 
6 The District Court was aware of the possibility of mootness, 360 
F. Supp., at 1183, n. 5, and expressed the view that even the "ter-
mination of plaintitrs de'f erral period • • • would not render this 




Due to the nature of appellant Sosna's claim the time 
' 
required for its judicial resolution inevitably would moot 
her personal grievance. It thus was apparent from the 
outset of this litigation that the only way to obtain 
judicial review of appellant's claim and of the claims of 
the class that she or any other class plaintiff could represent 
was by reliance on the more generous view of jurisdiction 
that is accorded the narrow class of cases that would "evade 
review" if governed by traditional definitions of case 
or controversy. These doctrines stem 
6. 
from the practical demands of time. Absent their invocation, 
a significant class of federal claims would remain unredressed 
for want of a spokesman who could retain a personal position 
of adversity throughout the entire course of litigation. 
Thus, when considering whether these cases present the 
degree of concreteness and adversity required by Article 
III, the Court has looked to the likelihood that the named 
plaintiff would again be confronted with an identical 
contr oversy or, in some cases, to the existence of a 
continuing controversy with unnamed members of the class. 
The same exigency that engenders these exceptions identifies 
their limits. In cases in which the alleged harm would not 
dissipate during the time required for resolution of the 
controversy, the general principles of Article III 
jurisdiction require that the plaintiff's personal stake 
in the litigation continue throughout the entirety of 
the litigation. 
In Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. rec, 219 U.S. 
489 (1911), where a challenged ICC order had expired, 
7. 
and in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), where 
petitioners sought to be certified as candidates in an 
election that had already been held, the Court expressed 
its concern that the defendants in those cases could be 
expected again to act contrary to the rights asserted by 
the particular named plaintiffs involved, and in each 
case the controversy was held not to be moot because the 
questions presented were "capable of repetition, yet 
evading review." That situation is not presented in 
appellant's case, for the durational residency require-
ment enforced by Iowa does not at this time bar her 
from the Iowa courts. Unless we were to speculate that 
she may move from Iowa, only to return and later seek 
a divorce within one year from her return, the concerns 
that prompted this Court's holdings in Southern Pacific 
and Moore do not govern appellant's situation. 
If appellant had sued only on her own behalf, both 
the fact that she now satisfies the one-year residency 
requirement and the fact that she has obtained a 
divorce elsewhere would make this case moot and require 
8. 
dismissal. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (CA3 1953), 
cert. granted, 347 U.S. 911, dismissed as moot, 347 U.S. 
911, dismissed as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954); SEC v. 
Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). 
But appellant brought this suit as a class action and 
sought to litigate the constitutionality of the durational 
residency requirement in a representative capacity. When 
the District Court certified the propriety of the class 
action, the class of unnamed persons described in the 
certification acquired a legal status separate from the 
8 
interest asserted by appellant. We are of the view that 
this factor significantly affects the mootness determination. 
Even though respondents in this proceeding might not 
again enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement 
against appellant, it is clear that they will enforce 
it against those persons in the class appellant sought to 
represent and which the District Court certified. In 
this sense the case before us is one in which state officials 
will undoubtedly continue to enforce the challenged 
9. 
statute and yet, because of the passage of time, no single 
challenger will remain subject to its restrictions for the 
period necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion. 
This problem was present in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330 (1972), and was there implicitly resolved in 
favor of the representative of the class. Respondent 
Blumstein brought a class action challenging the Tennessee 
law which barred persons from registering to vote unless, 
at the time of the next election, they would have resided 
in the State for a year and in a particular county for 
three months. By the time the District Court opinion 
73-762-OPINION 
SOSNA v. IOWA 5 
her case reached this Court, however, appellant had long 
since satisfied the Iowa durational residency require-
ment, and Iowa Code § 598.6 no longer stood as a barrier 
to her attempts to secure dissolution of her marriage in 




If appellant had sued only on her own behalf, both 
I the fa~t that she now satisfies the one-year residency 
"requirement and the fact that she has obt~i etl a di-
vorce elsew~ere would make this case moo nd require 
dismissal. Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 6 (CA3 1953), 
cert. granted, 347 U. S. 911, dismisse moot, 347 U.S. 
610 · (1954); SEC v. Medical C mittee for Human 
Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972). But appellant brought 
this suit as a class action sought to litigate the con-
stitutionality of the du 10nal residency requirement in 
a representative ca 1ty. When the District Court cer-
tified the propr· y of the class action, the class of un-
named pers described in the certification acquired a 
j Iegal sta s separate from the interest asserted by ap-
pell~ . We are of the view that this factor significantly 
a~ts the mootness determination. 
confronted with the reasonable likelihood that the problem will occur 
to members of the class of which plaintiff is currently a member." ;-
7 Counsel for appellant disclosed at oral argument that appellant 
has in fact obtained a divorce in New York. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. 
8 The certification of a suit as a class action has important conse-
quences for the unnamed members of the class. If the suit proceeds 
to judgment on the merits, it is contemplated that the decision will 
bind all persons who have been found at the time of certification to 
be members of the class. Rule 23 (c) (3); Advisory Committee Note, 
39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106. Once the suit is certified as a class action, it 
may not be settled or dismissed without the approval of the court. 
Rule 23 (e). 
6 
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In Southern Pacific Terminal Co; v. ICC, 219 U S. 
498 (1911), where a challenged ICC order had ex ired, 
and in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969), here 
petitioners sought to be certified as candidates in an elec-
tion that had already been held, the Court ex ressed its 
concern that the defendants in those cases uld be ex-
pected again to act contrary to the right asserted by 
the particular named plaintiffs involved, I} din each case 
the controversy was held not to be moot because the 
questions presented were "capable f repetition, yet 
evading review." That situat~on ts not presented in 
appellant's case, for the durati al residency require-
ment enforced by Iowa does t at this time bar her 
from the Iowa courts. U n_}!:JSS we were to speculate 
that she may move from I9wa, only to return and later 
seek a divorce within orny f ear from her return, the con-
cerns that prompted this Court's holdings in Southern / 
Pacific and M oore~o ot govern appellant's situatioo/ 
But -even though re ondents in this proceeding might , 
not again enforce e Iowa durational residency require-
ment against ap llant, it is clear that they will enforce 
it against thos persons' in the class appellant sought to 
represent a which the District Court certified. In 
this sense e case before us is one in which state officials 
will und btedly continue to enforce the challenged stat-
ute a yet, because of the passage -of time, no single 
cha nger will remain subject to its restrictions for the 
p iod necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion. 
This problem was present in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330 (1972), and was there implicitly resolved in 
favor of the representative of the class. Respondent 
Blumstein brought a class action challenging the Ten-
nessee law which barred persons from registering to vote 
unless, at the time of the ·next election, they would have 
resided in the State for a year and in a particular county 
for three months. By the time the District Court opinion 
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was filed , Blumstein had resided in the county for the 
requisite three months, and the State contended that his 
challenge to the county requirement was moot. The Dis-
trict Court rejected this argument, 337 F. Supp. 323, 324-
326 (MD Tenn. 1970). Although the State did not 
raise a mootness argument in this Court, we observed that 
the District Court had been correct: 
"Although appellee now can vote, the problem to 
voters posed by the Tennessee residence require-
men ts is ' "capable of repetition, yet evading re-
view."'" 405 U. S., at 333, n. 2. 
Although the Court did not expressly note the fact, by 
the time it decided the case Blumstein had resided in 
Tennessee tor far more than a year. 
The rationale of Dunn controls the present case. Al-
though the controversy is no longer live as to appellant 
Sosna, it remains very much alive for the class of persons 
she has been certified to represent. Like the other 
voters in Dunn, new residents of Iowa are aggrieved by 
an allegedly unconstitutional statute enforced by state 
officials. We believe that a case such as this, in which, 
as in Dunn, the issue sought to be litigated escapes full 
appellate review at the behest of any single challenger, 
does not inexorably become moot by the intervening 
resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs.9 
Dunn, supra; Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 
756 n. 5 (1973); Vaughn v. Bower, 313 F . Supp. 37, 
40 (Ariz.) , aff'd, 400 U. S. 884 (1970).J.0 
10 This has been tlie prevailing view in the circuits. See, e. g., . 
Cl,eaver v. Wilcox, 499 F . 2d 940 (CA9 1974); Rivera v. Freeman, 
46g F. 2d 115g (CA9 rn72) . Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073 
73-70~-0PINION 
SOSNA v. IOWA 
Our conclusion that this case is .not moot in no way 
dissipat€s the firmly established requirement that the 
judicial power of Art. III courts extends only to "cases 
and controversies" specified in that Article. There must 
not only be a named plaintiff who has such a case or con-
troversy at the time the complaint is filed. and at the 
time the class action is certified by the District Court 
pursuant to Rule 23,11 but there must be a live con-
troversy at the time this Court reviews the case.u SEC 
v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, supra. The 
controversy may exist, however, between a named de-
fendant and a member of the class represented by the 
named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named 
plaintiff has become moot. 
In so holding, we disturb no principles established by 
our .decisions with respect to class action litigation. A 
named plaintiff in a class action must show that the 
threat of injury in a case such as this is "real and im-
mediate," not ''con,iectural" or "hypothetical." O'Shea 
(CA3 1973) ; Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (MD Fla. 1973), 
nff'd sub nom . Makres v. Askew, - F. 2d - (CA5 1974); Moss v. 
Lane Co., 471 F. 2d &53 (CA4 1973); but see Watkins v. Chicago 
Housing Authority, 406 F. 2d 1234 (CA7 1969); Norman v. Connecti-
cut St ate Board of Parou-, 458 F '.ld 497 ( CA2 1972). 
et er t 1ere may e cases m w foh the con roversy mvolvmg 
Jaintiffs is such that it becomes moot before th strict 
Court can rcaso e e:q)ccted to rule on a certification motion, 
and whether in such an !1'1'!~~~~0el"ttfication can be said to 
roblems that are 
~n 
Tilere may be cases in which the controversy involving 
£he named plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to 
them before the District Court can reasonably be expected 
to rule on a certification motion. In such instances whether 
the certification can be said to t'relate back" to the' 
filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances 
•of the particular case and especially the reality of the 
claim that otherwise the issue would evade review. 
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